BYU Law Review
Volume 2011 | Issue 5

12-1-2011

Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies in
the Internet Era
Nathan Cortez

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Internet Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Nathan Cortez, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies in the Internet Era, 2011 BYU L. Rev. 1371 (2011).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2011/iss5/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Article 2

DO NOT DELETE

11/10/2011 4:50 PM

Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies in the
Internet Era
Nathan Cortez



Nearly forty years ago, Ernest Gellhorn documented the potentially
devastating impact that can occur when federal agencies issue adverse
publicity about private parties. Based on his article, the Administrative
Conference of the United States recommended that courts, Congress,
and agencies hold agencies to clear standards for issuing such publicity.
In the decades since, some agencies have adopted standards, but most
have not, and neither the courts nor Congress has intervened to impose
standards. Today, agencies continue to use countless forms of publicity to
pressure alleged regulatory violators and to amplify their overall
enforcement powers—all without affording due process or other
procedural safeguards that attach to more formal actions.
This Article renews the call for standards given four developments
since 1973. First, agencies now have even more incentives to issue
adverse publicity and eschew more formal statutory enforcement
actions. Second, new media give agencies more ways to issue adverse
publicity, for example, by making announcements via their websites,
Facebook, or Twitter. Third, new media make it easier for audiences to
misread or mischaracterize an agency’s message. Finally, hyperresponsive capital markets now process adverse publicity more swiftly
and hastily, multiplying the potential for damage.
In light of these developments, and after reviewing agency practices
and litigation since 1973, this Article revisits the earlier
recommendations. It calls for agencies to constrain themselves with
published standards, for Congress to recognize that publicity used as a
sanction is “final agency action,” and for courts to review adverse
publicity for an “abuse of discretion.” Agencies should retain wide
discretion to communicate with the public, but should be held
accountable if they abuse that discretion. To counterbalance this
restraint on agencies, Congress should enhance their statutory
 Assistant Professor, Southern Methodist University, Dedman School of Law. J.D.,
Stanford, B.A., University of Pennsylvania. I thank Alan Bromberg, Jeff Gaba, Julian Davis
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enforcement powers and resources, so that agencies do not need to rely on
extrastatutory tactics like adverse publicity.
***
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2003, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) publicly
condemned a drug company for exaggerating the safety and efficacy
of its cancer drug.1 The FDA communicated its objections via a Talk

1. FDA, Talk Paper T03-18: FDA Warns Public About Misrepresentations in
Marketing Claims About Drug to Treat Cancer (Mar. 14, 2003).
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Paper posted on its website, calling the company’s statements
“misleading,” “demonstrably false,” and “particularly egregious.”2
Within hours, the company’s stock price fell nearly 25%.3 The FDA
reportedly did not notify the company of its objections beforehand.4
Many years earlier, in 1973, Ernest Gellhorn documented how
adverse publicity by federal agencies can devastate products,
companies, or even entire industries.5 His article accompanied a
report for the Administrative Conference of the United States
(ACUS), which together recommended that agencies adopt
standards for issuing adverse publicity, and that courts and Congress
hold agencies accountable.6 Yet, in the decades since, very few
agencies have adopted standards. Courts have been exceedingly
reluctant to restrain agencies’ discretion to issue adverse publicity in
any meaningful way. Congress has not intervened. And scholarly
attention remains scant.7
Today, federal agencies continue to use press releases and
countless other forms of publicity to identify and pressure alleged
regulatory violators—and to amplify their overall statutory
enforcement powers. This can be problematic on a number of levels.

2. Id.
3. William W. Vodra, Nathan G. Cortez, & David E. Korn, The Food and Drug
Administration’s Evolving Regulation of Press Releases: Limits and Challenges, 61 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 623, 649 (2006); FDA Responds In Kind to SuperGen: Talk Paper Answers Press
Release, “THE PINK SHEET,” Mar. 17, 2003 at 7.
4. Vodra et al., supra note 3, at 649.
5. Ernest Gellhorn, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies, 86 HARV. L. REV.
1380 (1973).
6. Administrative Conference of the United States, Conference Recommendation No.
73-1 (adopted June 8, 1973); Rules and Regulations, 38 Fed. Reg. 16,839 (June 27, 1973)
(to be codified at 1 C.F.R. pt. 305). Both Professor Gellhorn and ACUS define “adverse
agency publicity” as an affirmative statement made by an agency that calls attention to an
agency action or policy and adversely affects an identified party. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at
1381.
7. Since Professor Gellhorn’s study, only a few articles have revisited the problem,
usually as part of an analysis ancillary to another issue. See, e.g., Eugene I. Lambert, Recalls,
Regulatory Letters, and Publicity—Quasi-Statutory Remedies, 31 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 360
(1976); Richard S. Morey, Publicity as a Regulatory Tool, 30 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 469
(1975); Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional Delegations of
Authority, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 874; James T. O’Reilly, The 411 on 515: How OIRA’s Expanded
Information Roles in 2002 Will Impact Rulemaking and Agency Publicity Actions, 54 ADMIN
L. REV. 835 (2002) [hereinafter O’Reilly, The 411 on 515]; James T. O’Reilly, Libels on
Government Websites: Exploring Remedies for Federal Internet Defamation, 55 ADMIN. L. REV.
507 (2003) [hereinafter O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites]; Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60
DUKE L.J. 1841 (2011).
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Agency publicity can be premature, excessive, misleading, or just
plain wrong. Agencies can make announcements without providing
due process or other procedural safeguards required for more formal
enforcement actions. Most agencies do not have clear statutory
authority to issue adverse publicity, particularly when used to punish
or sanction. And courts generally find that agency publicity is either
not reviewable or reviewable but not redressable. Agencies thus
enjoy almost boundless discretion to brandish adverse publicity.
These problems have been compounded by four developments
since 1973. First, because modern agencies are so bogged down by
procedural requirements and formal oversight, they have even more
incentives to issue adverse publicity and eschew more formal,
statutorily authorized enforcement actions. Moreover, agencies often
lack sufficient statutory authority or adequate resources (or some
combination of both) to police violators. Adverse publicity can be
strikingly convenient and effective compared to other enforcement
tools, making its allure clear to overburdened agencies.
Second, agencies have many more ways to disseminate adverse
publicity today, thanks to the Internet and new media. Every federal
agency has a website through which it can post press releases, news
updates, enforcement actions, and other material that regulated
companies would find to be negative or adverse to them in some
way. My review of FDA practices, for example, found that the agency
makes public announcements identifying specific products or
companies in over two dozen different formats. And agencies now
utilize podcasts, Internet news feeds, and even Facebook and Twitter
accounts, which allow them to make announcements more quickly—
and more casually—than ever.
Third, partly due to these first two developments, audiences now
have more opportunities to misread, misinterpret, or mischaracterize
agency announcements. The announcements themselves are more
truncated. And recipients can forward, link to, repost, and retweet
agency announcements with strikingly little effort. Mistakes are easily
multiplied.
Finally, capital markets and other audiences now process adverse
publicity more quickly and perhaps more hastily. Adverse publicity
can have a snowball effect, not only in an amorphous reputational
sense, but more tangibly by depressing stock prices, as in the
example above. The efficient market hypothesis (EMH), explained in
Part III.D below, lends some theoretical explanatory power here,
1374
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and might also offer empirical ways to measure the effects of adverse
publicity through “event studies.”
Together, these four developments suggest that we revisit the
use of adverse publicity by federal agencies. I begin by looking back
at what agencies did in response to the ACUS recommendation—
virtually nothing—and consider how agencies have both exercised
their discretion and defended themselves in litigation, examining
twenty-six federal court opinions since 1973 that challenged an
agency’s use of adverse publicity. I find that courts routinely hold
that agency publicity is not reviewable and not redressable under the
APA.
I conduct an in-depth case study of the FDA because it featured
prominently in Gellhorn’s article, it was the one agency that actually
proposed rules in response to ACUS (though it never finalized
them), and the FDA has litigated a number of cases since 1973
defending its use of adverse publicity. The FDA also has a very
compelling case that it needs to warn the public despite imperfect
information and scientific uncertainty, making it a good case study
for testing reforms.
My review makes a few noteworthy observations. For example,
the FDA relies on a medley of nonbinding guidance documents and
employee manuals that address public announcements and media
relations. However, none of these documents confront the longstanding concerns with adverse publicity.
The FDA also issues adverse or negative publicity in over two
dozen different formats, including press releases, warning letters, and
a mélange of advisories, alerts, notifications, and updates—not to
mention multiple Twitter feeds and the voluminous information it
releases on its website.
Moreover, after reviewing just one form of FDA publicity (“press
announcements”) over the last seven years, I find that (i) the FDA
issued over 1500 press announcements during that period, or almost
one per business day; (ii) 65% of these announcements identify a
specific product, company, or individual; (iii) 62% of this subgroup
are adverse or negative in some way; and (iv) 74% of that subgroup
publicize pending or preliminary agency actions, rather than final or
determinative actions.8 Thus, looking at just one of many forms of
publicity that the FDA uses, a large proportion (30%) are

8. See infra notes 256–59 and accompanying text.
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individualized, negative, and preliminary. Yet, the FDA does not
hold itself to written policies, does not offer procedural safeguards to
the parties singled out, and consistently takes the litigating position
that its announcements are not reviewable by courts.
After considering the FDA in depth, the Article also considers
cases involving the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Consumer Products
Safety Commission (CPSC), the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), and other agencies. Although these examples
offer variations on the FDA’s story—for example, the FTC restrains
itself through internal policies, and the CPSC adheres to clear
congressional directives—they otherwise confirm some of the longstanding concerns, suggesting that the problems might stretch across
the federal bureaucracy.
So what is the answer? As a baseline, agencies obviously must be
able to communicate with the public. They must have wide
discretion to issue warnings and alerts in the face of scientific
uncertainty and imperfect information. And they should be able to
use modern means to do so. But agency discretion should not be
boundless, particularly when used to sanction.
I address my recommendations to three parties: agencies,
Congress, and courts. I tailor these recommendations based on
agency practices since 1973, judicial opinions published since 1973,
and the four developments above. Agencies should articulate written
standards for issuing different forms of adverse publicity, particularly
via new media. These standards should address the content of
announcements and establish both internal procedures for issuing
publicity and procedures for private parties to request corrections or
retractions through timely administrative appealsall subject to
reasonable exceptions for emergencies and other justifications in the
public interest. Agency self-restraint is perhaps the most effective and
most realistic response.
Congress should create a baseline set of expectations, perhaps by
amending the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).9 The statute
should explicitly authorize agencies to issue adverse publicity, and
should delegate the responsibility to each agency to codify its own
procedures for self-restraint. Moreover, Congress should declare that
adverse publicity is “final agency action” under the APA and is

9. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500–96 (2006).
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reviewable for an abuse of discretion, as this seems like a classic case
for that standard. If these changes unduly hamper the ability of
agencies to encourage compliance and enforce their regulatory
schemes, then Congress should authorize more efficient statutory
enforcement mechanisms and should grant agencies the resources to
use them.
Finally, until Congress intervenes, courts should recognize that
publicity intended at least in part as a sanction should be reviewable
as final agency action under the APA. Parties aggrieved by agency
publicity need not exhaust administrative remedies because typically
there are none. And courts should recognize a cause of action under
the APA or via procedural due process, if applicable.
This Article makes these arguments in four parts, focusing on
how federal agencies wield adverse publicity.10 Part II describes the
basic problem and how Gellhorn and ACUS recommended
responding to it, counterposing agency motivations and public
benefits with the risks to private parties. In Parts III and IV, I
describe the aftermath. Part III examines the four developments
since 1973. Part IV then surveys what agencies have done since
1973, using the FDA as a case study and examining over two dozen
judicial opinions in which a party challenged a federal agency’s use of
publicity. Given these findings, Part V updates the call for standards,
urging agencies, Congress, and courts to check agency discretion.
Admittedly, it can be difficult to generalize about how agencies
use publicity because it is so varied, informal, and discretionary.11 But
10. Note that agencies often use press releases and other forms of publicity for other
reasons that I will not cover in this Article. For example, in Croplife America v. EPA, 329 F.3d
876, 878–879 (D.C. Cir. 2003), the D.C. Circuit invalidated the EPA’s attempt to announce
in a press release a binding new policy that it should have promulgated through notice and
comment rulemaking. And, of course, state agencies may also use publicity inappropriately. See,
e.g., Cox v. N. Va. Transp. Comm’n, 551 F.2d 555, 557–58 (4th Cir. 1976) (holding that
state agency employee was deprived of due process after agency commissioners granted
interviews attributing employee’s termination to financial scandal at agency and employee was
denied request for hearing); Dixon v. Pa. Crime Comm’n, 67 F.R.D. 425, 429 n.4, 430
(M.D. Pa. 1975) (finding no due process violation despite state crime commission publicizing
investigation and releasing audit reports); Gen. Elec. Co. v. N.Y. State Assembly Comm. on
Gov’t Operations, 425 F. Supp. 909, 915–16 (N.D.N.Y. 1975) (finding legislative
investigation and attendant adverse publicity surrounding it were caused as much by lawsuit
challenging it as the investigation itself). However, this Article limits its focus to federal
agencies.
11. O’Reilly, The 411 on 515, supra note 7, at 837–38; see also Alfred C. Aman, Jr.,
Bargaining for Justice: An Examination of the Use and Limits of Conditions by the Federal
Reserve Board, 74 IOWA L. REV. 837, 839 n.9 (1989) (noting in his examination of how the
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it continues to be one of the more coercive actions an agency can
take.12 This Article thus takes a fresh look at how modern agencies
use modern media against modern regulated parties, and what
standards should apply.
II. BOUNDLESS DISCRETION AND THE NEED FOR STANDARDS
Gellhorn analyzed a series of high-profile incidents in which
agency publicity devastated a company, a product, or even an
industry. His was not the first to address the topic,13 but it
accompanied an ACUS recommendation published in the Code of
Federal Regulations. Gellhorn’s primary concern was that agencies
issued publicity “without articulated standards or safeguards.”14 Yet,
despite the call for action, few standards or safeguards exist.
A. Agency Motivations and Public Benefits
Agencies have many motivations for issuing adverse publicity,
and these motivations have not changed considerably since 1973.
Agencies continue to issue publicity primarily to inform, to warn, or
to sanction.15 The first two do not provoke much debate—many
agencies are required by statute to inform and warn the public,16 and
publicity is an efficient way to do so.17 Indeed, some agencies

Federal Reserve Board bargains that the “malleability of informal decision-making makes it
difficult to study, but extremely important to the everyday functioning of an agency”); Noah,
supra note 7, at 897 (proposing a typology for scrutinizing agency “arm-twisting” and
acknowledging that any such typology would be oversimplified).
12. O’Reilly, The 411 on 515, supra note 7, at 836–37.
13. See, e.g., Michael R. Lemov, Administrative Agency News Releases: Public
Information Versus Private Injury, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 63 (1968); Note, Disparaging
Publicity by Federal Agencies, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1512 (1967); Note, The Distinction Between
Informing and Prosecutorial Investigations: A Functional Justification for “Star Chamber”
Proceedings, 72 YALE L.J. 1227 (1963).
14. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1381.
15. As Professor Gellhorn emphasized, agencies often issue adverse publicity for more
than one reason. Id. at 1382.
16. Consumer Product Safety Commission Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2051(b) (2006)
(requiring the CPSC to “protect the public against unreasonable risks of injury” and “assist
consumers in evaluating the comparative safety of consumer products”); Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act § 705(b), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301, 375(b) (2006) (requiring the FDA to issue
publicity when the agency believes there is “imminent danger to health, or gross deception of
the consumer”).
17. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1383.
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essentially exist to inform and warn the public.18 Very few would
argue, for example, that the SEC should not warn about major
investment frauds, or that the FDA should not warn about
hazardous products. We need agencies to alert the public.
But publicity can also serve as a form of sanction (whether
intended or not), when it punishes, deters, or coerces.19 The severity
depends on how sensitive the firm is to public disapproval,20 and
perhaps whether the firm is publicly traded and thus sensitive to
investor reactions. Some agencies like the SEC gained notoriety for
sanctioning companies this way.21
Agencies can also use publicity as an extrastatutory way to
amplify their statutory enforcement powers.22 Some use the threat of
adverse publicity to make up for their limited statutory enforcement
authority and the difficulty of proving violations.23 Agencies also use
adverse publicity as a more efficient pressure point to achieve goals
authorized by statute.24 Adverse publicity—or simply the threat of
it—often precedes or accompanies formal enforcement actions.
Agencies also defend their use of publicity as a way to
authoritatively state the agency’s positions and ensure that media
coverage is accurate.25 This use obviously can benefit the public, as
18. Id. at 1394 (stating that issuing publicity “is the essence of [the SEC’s] statutory
purpose”).
19. Id. at 1383.
20. Id. It is debatable whether corporations can be punished or deterred the same way
as individuals. See, e.g., BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON
CORPORATE OFFENDERS (1983); John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick”:
An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386
(1981); Andrew Cowan, Note, Scarlet Letters for Corporations? Punishment by Publicity Under
the New Sentencing Guidelines, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2387 (1992).
21. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1406, n.107 (noting that the Cost of Living Council and
SEC gained attention for aggressively issuing adverse publicity as a sanction).
22. Id. at 1398–1401.
23. Id. at 1398–99 (citing “civil rights commissions and agencies encouraging fair
employment practices,” including the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which
has a “broad mandate and limited enforcement powers”).
24. Noah, supra note 7, at 876.
25. See, e.g., SEC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION NO. OIG534: ALLEGATIONS OF IMPROPER COORDINATION BETWEEN THE SEC AND OTHER
GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES CONCERNING THE SEC’S ENFORCEMENT ACTION AGAINST
GOLDMAN SACHS & CO. 62 (Sept. 30, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/
foia/docs/oig-534.pdf [hereinafter SEC OIG]; FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures,
42 Fed. Reg. 12,436, 12,439 (Mar. 4, 1977) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 2) (“On a
number of occasions, FDA has issued publicity to prevent rumors and confusion.”); Gellhorn,
supra note 5, at 1390.
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agencies often apply byzantine regulatory schemes to highly
technical industries, which may be difficult for the lay public to
understand.
Agencies may target publicity to their constituents. Publicizing
enforcement actions is a way to remind Congress and the White
House that agencies are fulfilling their mandates,26 and that they
deserve every cent of their budgets. Moreover, publicity can also
appease interest groups that push for greater oversight.27
Finally, agencies use publicity because it is convenient. As
Gellhorn noted, “[p]ublicity is quicker and cheaper; it is not
presently subject to judicial review or other effective legal control;
and it involves the exercise of pure administrative discretion.”28 For
overburdened agencies, the allure of publicity is clear, particularly
compared to more formal actions.
Although some refer to the practice as a guerilla tactic or a lesser
form of blackmail,29 in most cases, agencies are acting upon several
motivationsmost of them perfectly legitimate.
B. The Risks to Private Parties
Several incidents inspired Gellhorn and ACUS. For example, in
1959 the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) held a
press conference warning the public not to buy cranberries from
Washington and Oregon because they might be contaminated with
carcinogens.30 He neglected to clarify that cranberries from other
states were safe, and punctuated his warning by stating that he
personally would not be eating cranberries for Thanksgiving.31 That
holiday season, “virtually the entire crop remained unsold, even
though 99% of it was subsequently cleared and marketed as
government approved.”32 The industry lost $21.5 million worth of
surplus, which ultimately led Congress to indemnify growers $8.5

26. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1393 (noting that adverse publicity by the FTC
“occasionally appears to be influenced as much by the desire to enhance its political position as
by legitimate policy considerations”).
27. Id. at 1399 (noting that EEOC employees admitted to using more pejorative
language in press statements to cater to constituent groups).
28. Id. at 1424.
29. O’Reilly, The 411 on 515, supra note 7, at 836.
30. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1408.
31. Id.
32. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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million.33 The incident became known in the industry as Black
Monday.34
The cranberry announcement demonstrated the risks of publicity
to private parties: it exaggerated the danger to consumers; it used
excessive language; it failed to limit the scope of the warning; it
failed to consider the costs to the industry; and it bypassed statutory
remedies that would have been less damaging and just as swift, such
as seizing the cranberries or enjoining producers from distributing
them.35 The episode captured both the variety and severity of the
risks.
Contemporary examples show similar patterns. In 2006, after
receiving reports from the CDC about an outbreak of E. coli related
to bagged spinach, the FDA issued a series of press releases warning
consumers.36 Although FDA’s initial announcement identified
“bagged fresh spinach” as the likely culprit,37 its second press release
a day later broadened it to “fresh spinach or spinach-containing
products.”38 The FDA did not narrow its warnings until five days
later, when it excluded only frozen and canned spinach from the
warnings.39
And the FDA was slow to clarify the geographic scope of the
danger. It took the agency two days after identifying three counties
in California that may have produced the spinach to clarify that
consumers could safely eat spinach grown elsewhere.40 Ultimately,
33. Id. at 1409–10, n.118.
34. Id. at 1408.
35. Id. at 1409.
36. Press Announcements, September 2006–October 2006, FDA PRESS ANNOUNCEMENTS,
http://tinyurl.com/3q3qkav (last visited Nov. 6, 2011) (showing eighteen separate press
releases by the FDA on the E. coli O157:H7 outbreak in September and October 2006).
37. Press Announcement, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., FDA Warning on Serious
Foodborne E.coli O157:H7 Outbreak (Sept. 14, 2006), http://www.fda.gov/
NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2006/ucm108731.htm.
38. Press Announcement, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., FDA Statement on Foodborne
E.coli O157:H7 Outbreak in Spinach (Sept. 19, 2006), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/
Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2006/ucm108732.htm.
39. Press Announcement, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., FDA Statement on Foodborne
E.coli O157:H7 Outbreak in Spinach (Sept. 20, 2006), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/
Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2006/ucm108740.htm.
40. Press Announcement, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., FDA Statement on Foodborne
E.coli O157:H7 Outbreak in Spinach (Sept. 22, 2006), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/
Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2006/ucm109578.htm; Sara M. Benson, Guidance for
Improving the Federal Response to Foodborne Illness Outbreaks Associated with Fresh Produce, 65
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 503, 509 (2010).
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the FDA traced the E. coli contamination to spinach produced
during a single shift, on a single day, at a single farm.41 Although
such precision could not be expected in the agency’s initial warnings,
its delay in narrowing the scope of the warning evoked the cranberry
episode nearly fifty years earlier. Critics also argue that the FDA
could have traced the source of contamination much sooner,
narrowed its warnings to certain packaging dates, and reassured
consumers more quickly that spinach was safe to eat.42
The episode turned out to be one of the most damaging in the
nation’s history, both to consumers and to the industry.43 Over 200
consumers got sick, half of whom required hospitalization, with
three deaths.44 It cost the industry roughly $350 million, and spinach
sales have yet to recover.45
Another contemporary example is the salmonella outbreak in
2008, which the FDA and CDC incorrectly blamed on tomatoes.46
The FDA’s press announcements included a steadily-expanding list
of states from which the agency deemed it was safe to consume
tomatoes. Eventually, the FDA whittled down its warnings to
tomatoes produced in Florida and Mexico, and then even further to
specific areas of Florida and Mexico.47 Nearly six weeks later, the
FDA identified peppers as the culprit rather than tomatoes, although
the CDC disagreed.48 The erroneous publicity cost the tomato
industry roughly $200 million.49
For these reasons, Gellhorn’s original concerns remain valid
nearly four decades later: agency publicity is problematic “when it is
erroneous, misleading or excessive or it serves no authorized agency
purpose.”50 My review finds that the problems are even broader than

41. Benson, supra note 40, at 509.
42. Id. at 515–16.
43. Id. at 509.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 509, 516 (citing Developing A Comprehensive Response to Food Safety Before the
S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 110th Cong. 57–62 (2007) (statement of
Caroline Smith DeWaal, Food Safety Director, Center for Science in the Public Interest)).
46. Id. at 510.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. (citing Denis G. Maki, Coming to Grips with Foodborne Infection—Peanut Butter,
Peppers, and Nationwide Salmonella Outbreaks, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 949, 949 (2009)).
50. Adverse Agency Publicity (Recommendation No. 73-1), 38 Fed. Reg. 16,839,
16,839 (June 27, 1973).
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that. I organize the problems into four categories: (1) the substance
of announcements can be wrong or misleading; (2) the procedures
for issuing publicity can be inadequate; (3) the authority to issue
publicity can be unclear or lacking; and (4) there is often no way to
redress mistakes or abuses.
The first problem is with the substance of the publicity itself.
Agency publicity can mislead or mischaracterize by failing to explain
the limited scope of the agency’s objections or by failing to clarify
that the allegations have not fully been adjudicated.51 Publicity can
be premature, such as when an agency publicizes that it has begun
investigating a company or filed a complaint, or that a grand jury has
indicted a company, without simply clarifying that no violations have
been proven. Publicity can be excessive, such as when an agency uses
pejorative language, implies broader violations or a history of
violations not proven, or goes beyond factual reporting.52 And
publicity can be just plain wrong, such as when an agency relies on
erroneous information or reports information that turns out to be
inaccurate.
The second problem is procedural. When agencies issue
publicity, they may not give prior notice or any sort of chance to
plead the company’s case, which is often required by due process or
by statute when taking more formal actions.53 When agencies make
rules or adjudicate, they generally have to provide some sort of
notice and an opportunity to be heard.54 But as Gellhorn
emphasized, “usually no protection other than the common sense
and good will of the administrator prevents unreasonable use of

51. Another problem is that agencies often commission third-party reports and publicize
their findings without adequately explaining the nature of the study or its limitations. For
example, the Public Health Service (PHS) aggressively promoted its Cigarette Report to the
media and failed to correct reasonable misperceptions that the Report was a culmination of
clinical studies on the safety of cigarettes based on new data, rather than a post-hoc review of
earlier studies. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1384–88.
52. Agencies also frequently adorn publicity with quotes from agency prosecutors or
investigators. See, e.g., News Release, Federal Trade Commission, Kevin Trudeau Banned from
Infomercials (Sep. 7, 2004), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/09/trudeaucoral.shtm.
53. In an early example, a federal court held that the FDA did not have to provide a
prior hearing before issuing adverse publicity condemning a cancer clinic’s therapeutic claims
and marketing practices. Hoxsey Cancer Clinic v. Folsom, 155 F. Supp. 376, 377–78 (D.D.C.
1957). See Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1419–20.
54. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1420; Administrative Procedure Act §§ 5–8, 5 U.S.C. §§
554–57 (2006).
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coercive publicity.”55 In disputes with agencies, private parties have
been unable to convince them to stop disseminating information
that the party believes is false or misleading.56 As a former FDA
lawyer cautioned, “there is relatively little a company can do” to stop
or minimize the damage.57
The third problem relates to the lack of agency authority. The
vast majority of agencies do not have explicit statutory authority to
issue adverse publicity, and thus do so either as a form of
extrastatutory enforcement, or as a power they derive from the
interstices of broadly worded enabling statutes.58 Arguably, only the
FDA, CPSC, and the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) have
explicit statutory authority to issue adverse publicity.59 Thus, many
agencies that do so are accused of exceeding their statutory powers.60
Nevertheless, the vast majority of agencies can probably justify their
use of publicity through broadly worded enabling statutes,61
sometimes treating the statutes as “constitutions” and interpreting
their broad provisions as a form of “necessary and proper” clause
55. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1420.
56. Impro Prods., Inc. v. Block, 722 F.2d 845, 846 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (manufacturer of
veterinary product disputing scientific conclusions about effectiveness of product in article
published by agency scientists that the USDA widely disseminated).
57. Arthur N. Levine, FDA Enforcement: How It Works, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
FOOD AND DRUG LAW AND REGULATION 277 (Kenneth R. Piña & Wayne L. Pines eds., 2d
ed. 2002).
58. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1384.
59. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 705(b), 21 U.S.C. § 375(b); Consumer
Product Safety Act § 6(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b); Inventors’ Rights Act of 1999, 35 U.S.C. §
297(d) (authorizing the Patent and Trademark Office to publicize complaints against
invention promoters).
60. For example, the Attorney General’s Commission on Administrative Procedures
alleged that the Federal Alcohol Administration abused its power and exceeded its statutory
authority by threatening to use adverse publicity. See FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY
GEN.’S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURES, S. DOC. NO. 77-8, at 135 (1941). Professor
Gellhorn also noted that the Cost of Living Council’s use of adverse publicity was not
authorized by statute. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1404–05; Noah, supra note 7, at 890–91.
Moreover, in virtually every case discussed in Part IV, infra, the aggrieved party alleges that the
agency exceeded its statutory authority.
61. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1410–11 (noting, for example, that the FDA, like other
agencies, “can point to the usual vague grants of authority in its enabling act”); Noah, supra
note 7, at 890–91. For just one of many examples, the Clean Air Act directs the EPA to
“collect and disseminate” information on air quality and pollution. 42 U.S.C. § 7403(b)(6)
(2006). As James Conrad Jr. observes, “These broad authorizations generally are decades old,
and thus were not enacted at a time when these agencies were consciously using information as
a means of achieving regulatory goals.” James W. Conrad, Jr., The Information Quality Act—
Antiregulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions?, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 521, 529 (2002–03).

1384

DO NOT DELETE

1371

11/10/2011 4:50 PM

Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies

that enables agencies to carry out their statutory responsibilities.62
One court even declared that agencies’ enforcement powers “would
be crippled were these agencies not permitted to use the quick and
cheap instrument of publicity.”63
Agencies obviously need to communicate with the public, and it
would be unwise to weaken their ability to communicate legitimate
messages that are not intended to punish regulated firms. Moreover,
agencies have their own First Amendment right to speak, though the
contours and extent of this right are not yet clear.64
Unfortunately, it is difficult to categorize publicity as either
authorized by statute or ultra vires. On one side, most agencies can
justify their publicity based on expansive delegations of authority to
disseminate information and notify the public. And on the other
side, even agencies that have clear statutory authority to issue
publicity can easily stretch or exceed it.65
The APA states that agencies may not impose sanctions “except
within jurisdiction delegated to the agency and as authorized by
law.”66 But it can be exceedingly difficult to determine when an
agency is using publicity as a sanction, particularly if the agency has
multiple motivations.67 As the SEC’s investigation of one recent
incident reveals, agency personnel consider many priorities when
issuing adverse publicity, including the desire to deter other
violations.68
62. Peter Barton Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation Under the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act, 28 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 177, 178 (1973). For a rejoinder, see Lars Noah,
Interpreting Agency Enabling Acts: Misplaced Metaphors in Administrative Law, 41 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1463, 1476–78 (2000).
63. See Indus. Safety Equip. Ass’n v. EPA, 837 F.2d 1115, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
64. Cf. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S.Ct. 1125 (2009).
65. For a nuanced, thoughtful effort to categorize agencies’ use of adverse publicity and
other forms of administrative arm-twisting, see Noah, supra note 7, at 896–99. In one case, a
court found that the CPSC exceeded its statutory authority to publicize product hazards but
denied a motion to order the agency to retract its earlier press release. United States v. 52,823
Children’s Dolls, More or Less, No. 89 Civ. 4643 (JFK), 1989 WL 140250, at *7–8
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 1989).
66. Administrative Procedure Act § 558(b), 5 U.S.C. § 558(b) (2006).
67. In Trudeau v. FTC, the district court cautioned that private parties should not be
permitted to “root through the files of a federal agency to determine the motivation of any
press release . . . .” 384 F. Supp. 2d 281, 294 (D.D.C. 2005). In Invention Submission Corp. v.
Rogan, the PTO seemed to have a long-standing bone to pick with a particular company, but
was authorized by statute to publicize complaints about the industry and did not identify the
particular company in the press release. 357 F.3d 452, 460 (4th Cir. 2004).
68. See generally SEC OIG, supra note 25.
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This problem is aggravated because Congress generally either
ignores or acquiesces to agency practices. For example, the D.C.
Circuit said that Congress had long been aware of the FTC’s
practices of “issuing news releases and the adverse effects resulting
therefrom” and had essentially acquiesced to them.69 Congress has
specifically bounded agency discretion to issue adverse publicity, but
in only three circumstances.70 And Congress even specifically
authorized one agency to publicize consumer complaints that had
not yet been adjudicated,71 seemingly insensitive to the dangers.72
But courts have noted that the proper venue for challenging
agency publicity is through the political rather than the judicial
branch.73 And courts have echoed Gellhorn’s observation that
potential injuries are “best controlled by internal agency restraint.”74
Aggrieved parties sometimes seek private bills from Congress asking
for compensation, but Congress has largely abstained from passing
such bills. And even when Congress does recommend compensation,
the Court of Federal Claims rarely grants it.75
The fourth problem with agency publicity is the lack of redress.
Courts tend to find that agency publicity is either not reviewable, or

69. FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Sch., Inc., 404 F.2d 1308, 1309 (D.C. Cir.
1968). Of course, the idea that congressional silence equals “acquiescence” is not without
controversy. Two canonical examples are Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) and
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
70. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2613; Consumer Product Safety Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2055(b); Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a). The FEC Act
prohibits the Federal Election Commission from publicizing investigations for fear of adverse
publicity being premature, unfair, and interfering with campaigns. See Common Cause v. FEC,
83 F.R.D. 410, 411 (D.D.C. 1979) (citing the legislative history of 2 U.S.C. § 437). For
discussions of the others, see Part IV.B, infra.
71. In 1999, Congress enacted the Inventors’ Rights Act of 1999, which required the
Patent and Trademark Office to publicize complaints filed with the PTO against invention
promoters. 35 U.S.C. § 297; 37 C.F.R. § 4.1 (2011). Another possible example is that in
2007, Congress required the FDA to maintain a website to disclose adverse events being
investigated by the agency for possible labeling revisions. FDA Amendments Act of 2007, Pub.
L. No. 110-85, § 915, 121 Stat. 823, 958 (2007) (codified at 21 U.S.C § 355(r)(2)(D)
(Supp. I 2007).
72. 145 Cong. Rec. S14,521, 29,418–19 (daily ed. Nov. 10, 1999) (statement of Sen.
Joseph Lieberman); but see 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a) (2006).
73. Invention Submission Corp. v. Rogan, 357 F.3d 452, 459–60 (4th Cir. 2004);
Flue-Cured Tobacco v. EPA, 313 F.3d 852, 861 (4th Cir. 2002); Indus. Safety Equip. Ass’n
v. EPA, 837 F.2d 1115, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Trudeau v. FTC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 281, 290
(D.D.C. 2005).
74. E.g., Indus. Safety Equip., 837 F.2d at 1118.
75. See Part V.B.1, infra.
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if it is, not redressable.76 In 1973, ACUS warned that adverse agency
publicity “is almost never subject to effective judicial review.”77 Not
much has changed since then. In turn, agencies will be less deterred
and less likely to check their own discretion.78
Even when judicial review is available, rarely can it remedy or
undo the damage.79 Courts cannot unring the bell. The few courts
that actually found that an agency exceeded its statutory authority
have searched for ways, such as corrective publicity, to repair the
damage, but have struggled to find an adequate remedy.80 Some
agencies, like the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA), believe that corrective publicity can correct prior errors,81
despite the long-standing critique of that assumption.82
Finally, courts are justifiably reluctant to hold agencies
accountable when an agency has mixed motives for publicizing
alleged wrongdoing.83 One court went as far as saying that “[t]he
courts may no more enjoin Government departments from issuing
statements to the public than they may enjoin a public official from
making a speech.”84 This problem is particularly important, given the
recent case law fortifying the government’s free speech rights,85 as
well as intuitive concerns that agencies should not be chilled by
congressional oversight or judicial second-guessing when warning
the public.

76. See Part V.C.2, infra.
77. Adverse Agency Publicity (Recommendation No. 73-1), 38 Fed. Reg. 16,839,
16,839 (June 23, 1973).
78. Noah, supra note 7, at 936–37.
79. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1420.
80. United States v. 52,823 Children’s Dolls, More or Less, No. 89 Civ. 4643 (JFK),
1989 WL 140250, at *7–8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 1989) (denying a motion to order the CPSC
to publicly retract its previous press release because it would only further taint the product at
issue and would confuse consumers).
81. For example, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration stated that
suppliers whose components are erroneously identified as defective in recall notices can simply
counter “[a]ny adverse publicity that does erroneously affect a supplier . . . by publicizing the
correct information when it becomes available.” Petitions for Rulemaking, Defect and
Noncompliance Orders, 60 Fed. Reg. 17,254, 17,257 (1995).
82. O’Reilly, The 411 on 515, supra note 7, at 849.
83. See, e.g., FTC v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 1066, 1067 (D. Utah
1997) (rejecting allegations that the FTC exceeded its statutory authority to make information
public when in the “public interest”).
84. Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 284 F. Supp. 745, 748 (D.D.C. 1968).
85. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009).
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Thus, adverse publicity presents various risks to private parties,
many of which have persisted for decades.
C. Recommendations by Gellhorn and ACUS
Given the risks, Gellhorn and ACUS recommended that agencies
publish procedures and articulate standards for issuing adverse
publicity.86 Congress originally established ACUS to advise the
President, Congress, and agencies themselves on how to improve the
fairness and efficiency of federal agencies.87 ACUS published its
nonbinding recommendations in the Federal Register and codified
them in the Code of Federal Regulations.88 Gellhorn turned his
report for ACUS into an article for the Harvard Law Review, which
became the canonical statement on agency publicity.
When Gellhorn surveyed federal agencies in the early 1970s, he
found that although many agencies issued adverse publicity, virtually
none imposed standards on the practice.89 So he encouraged
agencies to adopt written standards and publish them, which would
both force agencies to evaluate their practices and inform regulated
parties.90
To this end, Gellhorn and ACUS recommended that agencies
create policies to help them decide whether to issue publicity in the
first place.91 Agencies, they argued, should consider whether they are
specifically authorized to issue publicity, not including general grants
of authority to make information public.92 They should consider
whether publicity is necessary, for example, to protect public health
or prevent substantial economic harm.93 Agencies should consider

86. Adverse Agency Publicity (Recommendation No. 73-1), 38 Fed. Reg. 16,839,
16,839 (June 27, 1973).
87. 5 U.S.C. § 574(1) (2006). Congress declined to renew funding and authorization
for ACUS in 1995, allowing it to dissolve over bipartisan objections. However, ACUS was
resurrected with new funding in 2010.
88. Adverse Agency Publicity, 38 Fed. Reg. at 16,839; 1 C.F.R. § 305.73–1 (1974).
89. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1384–85, 1401 (finding that the EEOC had never
examined or announced guidelines governing its use of publicity).
90. Id. at 1423–24; Adverse Agency Publicity, 38 Fed. Reg. at 16,839.
91. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1424.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1425–26; Adverse Agency Publicity, 38 Fed. Reg. at 16,839. For example,
Gellhorn recommended that the FTC “limit the use of publicity to cases in which it was
necessary to warn the public about imminent danger,” among other circumstances. Gellhorn,
supra note 5, at 1427.
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alternatives that are equally effective but less damaging.94 Gellhorn
emphasized that publicity “should usually be a sanction of last, not
first resort.”95 Agencies should be aware of the likelihood and
severity of the harm that the publicity might cause.96 Agencies
should consider how accurate and reliable the information
supporting the publicity is, including the likelihood that it would
influence the public.97 Finally, agencies should be more circumspect
when publicizing pending adjudications.98 Publicity about
investigations or “pending agency trial-type proceedings should issue
only in limited circumstances. . . .”99 Driving these recommendations
is the idea that the damage from adverse publicity is hard to
undoagencies cannot unring the bellso they should carefully
consider the initial decision to issue publicity.
If an agency answers this whether question affirmatively, the
recommendations urged that agency policies also address the content
of publicity, factoring how complex the issue is, how sophisticated
the audience is, and whether to reprint pleadings or other
documents.100 Agency guidelines should instruct personnel to use
language that is factual and nonpejorative,101 and clarify that
investigations and complaints are tentative and limited in scope.102
The recommendations also called for agency policies to specify
the internal procedures agencies will use, including procedures
available to the subjects of the publicity. First, policies should make
clear who within the agency may issue publicity.103 The policies
should direct media inquiries to a single source and away from
employees that handle the investigations or litigation.104 Second,
Gellhorn urged agencies to consider allowing private parties to seek
94. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1426. ACUS urged agencies to use adverse publicity
“only to the extent necessary to foster agency efficiency, public understanding, or the accuracy
of news coverage.” Adverse Agency Publicity, 38 Fed. Reg. at 16,839.
95. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1426.
96. Id. at 1427.
97. Id. at 1426; Adverse Agency Publicity, 38 Fed. Reg. at 16,839.
98. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1428.
99. Adverse Agency Publicity, 38 Fed. Reg. at 16,839.
100. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1430; id.
101. Adverse Agency Publicity, 38 Fed. Reg. at 16,839.
102. Id. (“Where information in adverse agency publicity has a limited basis—for
example, allegations subject to subsequent agency adjudication—that fact should be
prominently disclosed.”); Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1430.
103. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1430.
104. Id.
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redress within the agency.105 And perhaps most importantly, agencies
should consider notifying private parties in advance and giving them
an opportunity to respond before publicity is issued.106 This latter
provision seems to be the lynchpin: it would have a prophylactic
effect on restraining agency discretion, and it would satisfy
procedural concerns.
The recommendations also addressed courts. Courts should not
be reluctant to review agency publicity, particularly the threshold
question of whether an agency has statutory authority.107 If a court
determines that no such authority to issue publicity exists, it should
grant injunctions if the private party can show that the injuries are
not compensable at law.108 Courts should consider whether agencies
bypassed less burdensome alternatives.109 They should not be
hesitant to review agency practices and procedures, even though
these arguably are not “final agency action[s]” under the APA.110
Finally, courts can use devices to protect the anonymity of the
private party—such as allowing anonymous complaints, sealing the
pleadings, and holding in camera hearings—which would prevent
“the very injury the plaintiff seeks to avoid or have compensated.”111
Finally, three statutory reforms were addressed to Congress.
First, Congress should specifically authorize agencies to issue adverse
publicity, using the Consumer Product Safety Act’s provisions as a
model.112 The Act requires the CPSC to (i) notify manufacturers
before publishing damaging information, (ii) give companies a
reasonable opportunity to respond, and (iii) publish a symmetrical
retraction of any inaccurate or misleading disclosures.113 If Congress
cannot do this on an agency-by-agency basis, it should amend the
APA.114 Second, Congress should authorize direct judicial review to
determine whether the agency satisfied its own policies and

105. Id. at 1431.
106. Id.; Adverse Agency Publicity, 38 Fed. Reg. at 16,839.
107. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1432.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1433.
110. Id. at 1434.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1435.
113. Id. (citing Consumer Product Safety Act § 5(b)(1), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2055(b)(1)
(Supp. 1973)).
114. Id.

1390

DO NOT DELETE

1371

11/10/2011 4:50 PM

Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies

procedures.115 Congress should allow courts to issue orders
compelling agencies to retract or explain publicity, or change the
agency’s policies and procedures.116 Finally, Congress should amend
the Federal Tort Claims Act117 to compensate parties injured by
adverse agency publicity that was (i) directed at the party, (ii)
“materially erroneous, substantially misleading, or clearly excessive,”
and (iii) “not remedied by the final administrative action.”118
The thrust of these recommendations was to reign in the
seemingly boundless discretion agencies enjoy. But virtually none of
these recommendations came to fruition.
III. WHY THE PROBLEMS ARE AMPLIFIED TODAY
Despite the call for standards and its subsequent echoes,119
agency discretion remains virtually unbound. Today, the problems
are amplified given four interrelated developments—all of which can
render adverse publicity not only more damaging but also harder to
remedy.
A. More Incentives to Use Adverse Publicity
Since the 1973 ACUS recommendations, agencies have been
given more incentives to rely on adverse publicity. Much of this
pertains to the evolutionary arc of modern regulatory agencies,
which is well-known. Through the twentieth century, Congress
granted and courts upheld increasingly broad delegations of
authority to empower agencies to respond to problems of greater
scope and complexity. The legislative, executive, and judicial
branches tried to counterbalance this shift of power by imposing
various checks and balances on agencies, which progressively
“ossified” agency practices.120 Agencies with finite resources and
expanding responsibilities responded by developing an arsenal of
informal tools not specifically authorized by statute and not subject
to judicial review.121 Thus, the traditional focus of administrative law
115.
116.
117.
(2006).
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 1436.
Id.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401–02, 2411–12, 2671–80
Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1437–39.
See, e.g., Lambert, supra note 7; Morey, supra note 7; Noah, supra note 7.
Noah, supra note 7, at 875.
Id.
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scholarship on rulemaking and adjudication “represent[s] only a
small fraction of agency activity” today.122 Adverse publicity is a
perfect example of what Lars Noah calls extrastatutory “armtwisting.”123
From federal agencies’ perspective, this is perfectly
understandable. Agencies often struggle to carry out their statutory
mandates, often due to some combination of insufficient funding,
watered-down statutory authority, formal and informal oversight by
the political branches, and industry pressures. Agencies cannot
enforce all regulations at all times. Moreover, the refrain that
agencies are hostile to regulated industries tends to be overblown.
Agencies frequently try to cooperate with and accommodate industry
interests, which triggers criticisms that agencies are too industryfriendly. Agencies rightly feel they are in a Catch-22. Either way,
modern regulatory agencies often find that adverse publicity is much
more convenient than using more traditional regulatory tools.
B. More Ways to Issue Adverse Publicity
The second major evolution resides less with agencies and more
with the platforms now available to them. Today, every federal
agency has a website, and through these websites agencies can
publish a staggering amount of freestanding information about
companies that is not disclosed as part of rulemaking.124 A number of
catalysts encouraged this. The 1996 Electronic Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) Amendments required federal agencies to
establish electronic reading rooms that make important documents
available to the public, including those documents likely to be
requested via FOIA.125 The 2002 E-Government Act requires
agencies to make rulemaking accessible electronically by soliciting
and accepting comments online.126 More recently, the Obama

122. Id. at 874.
123. Id. Professor Noah defines “arm-twisting” as “a threat by an agency to impose a
sanction or withhold a benefit in hopes of encouraging ‘voluntary’ compliance with a request
that the agency could not impose directly on a regulated entity.” This definition encompasses,
and Professor Noah thus addresses, adverse publicity. Id.
124. Conrad, supra note 61, at 526.
125. Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104231, 110 Stat. 3048 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006)).
126. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 206, 116 Stat. 2899, 2915–16
(2002).

1392

DO NOT DELETE

1371

11/10/2011 4:50 PM

Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies

administration has emphasized transparency in the federal
government.127
But even without these initiatives, most agencies have realized
that websites are an efficient way to communicate. In fact, press
releases and other forms of publicity may represent a small fraction of
the information that an agency makes public about a private party.128
Most agencies publish enforcement actions, including preliminary
investigations and warnings.129 Agencies also post comments
submitted during rulemaking, company reports, license applications,
and copious amounts of other information about firms.
Agencies also use modern media, sometimes as a response to
how regulated firms use it. For example, the FDA used adverse
publicity to respond to a company that had issued its own publicity,
in part to reach the same audience.130 The PTO used its own
advertising campaign to counter deceptive advertising by an
invention submission marketer.131 Our intuition might be to let
agencies fight fire with fire. After all, companies subject to adverse
agency publicity often issue their own publicity simultaneously as a
counter.132 Today, these publicity wars use more sophisticated
weaponry than in 1973.
Federal agencies have also embraced new media, such as
podcasts, RSS feeds, and even Twitter feeds.133 For example, of the
127. Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 21, 2009).
128. For an account of how private parties can address inaccurate or misleading
information about them on agency websites, see O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra
note 7, at 507.
129. See, e.g., EPA, Enforcement and Compliance History Online, EPA.GOV,
http://www.epa.gov/echo (last updated Sept. 7, 2011); FDA, Criminal Investigations,
FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/CriminalInvestigations/default.htm (last updated
Sept. 12, 2011); OSHA, Establishment Search, OSHA.GOV, http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/
establishment.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2011); SEC, Litigation, SEC.GOV
http://www.sec.gov/litigation.shtml (last modified Dec. 20, 2011).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 1–4.
131. Invention Submission Corp. v. Rogan, 357 F.3d 452, 455 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting
the PTO’s press release that the agency was “unveil[ing] a television and radio campaign in five
media markets to counter the flood of deceptive advertising aimed at America’s independent
inventors” (citation omitted)).
132. Banfi Products issued its own press release on the same day that the ATF issued a
press release announcing that wine imported by the company was likely contaminated. Banfi
Products Corp. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 107, 119 (Fed. Cl. 1997).
133. For example, the FDA publishes four separate podcasts and eighteen separate RSS
feeds. See FDA, Subscribe to Podcasts and News Feeds, FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/
AboutFDA/ContactFDA/StayInformed/RSSFeeds/default.htm (last updated Feb. 11,
2011).
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five agencies I address (the CPSC, EPA, FDA, FTC, and SEC), all
but the FTC maintain a Twitter feed, often with thousands of
subscribers or “followers,” several of which are news media
organizations. Agencies do not use Twitter to announce what they
had for lunch. The CPSC routinely announces product recalls on
Twitter.134 The EPA maintains 18 separate Twitter feeds, including
“EPA News” and a feed for EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson.135 The
FDA has several Twitter feeds dedicated to drugs, devices, tobacco,
and recalls generally.136 The SEC announces enforcement actions
under its “SEC News” Twitter feed.137 In July 2010, it “tweeted”
that Goldman Sachs had agreed to pay $550 million to settle SEC
charges, with a link to the agency’s press release.138
New media allow agencies to communicate with audiences more
quickly and more casually than ever. These media utilize truncated,
blurb-inducing formats to encourage wide disseminationTwitter,
for example, is famous for limiting posts to 140 characters. Thus,
agency announcements via new media are even more distilled and
have less room to explain the nuance of complex regulatory actions
than traditional press releases. This is a considerable departure from
1973, and one that agencies should consider when creating internal
guidelines.

134. See OnSafety, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/OnSafety (last visited Sept. 12, 2011).
As of September 12, 2011, more than 11,000 people were following this Twitter feed.
135. See EPAnews, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/EPAnews (last visited Sept. 12, 2011);
lisapjackson, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/lisapjackson (last visited Sept. 12, 2011). As of
September 12, 2011, the EPA News feed had over 14,000 followers and the Lisa Jackson feed
at over 23,000 followers.
136. See FDADeviceInfo, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/FDADeviceInfo (last visited
Sept. 12, 2011); FDA_Drug_Info, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/FDA_Drug_Info (last
visited Sept. 12, 2011); FDArecalls, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/#!/FDArecalls (last
visited Sept. 12, 2011); and FDATobacco, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/FDATobacco (last
visited Sept. 12, 2011). Together, these FDA Twitter feeds had roughly 252,000 subscribers
or followers as of September 12, 2011, with FDArecalls alone boasting nearly 200,000
followers.
137. See SEC_News, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/SEC_News?source=onebox (last
visited Sept. 12, 2011). The SEC also has Twitter feeds for investor education
(http://twitter.com/SEC_Investor_Ed), which includes announcements of enforcement
actions.
138. Press Release, SEC, Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC
Charges Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO (July 15, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2010/2010-123.htm.
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C. More Opportunities to Misinterpret Publicity

New media also make it more likely that audiences will misread,
misunderstand, or mischaracterize the announcement. Readers can
forward, repost, link to, and retweet agency announcements with
very little effort. Readers can even create their own pages or news
feeds that essentially make agency announcements for them. For
example, Facebook users created a page for the Food and Drug
Administration, which allows other users to link to FDA
announcements and post other information that casual readers could
easily attribute to the agency itself.139 Sometimes it can be difficult to
determine if the agency is authoring the content or not.140 For
example, some Twitter feeds include agency names in the title (e.g.,
“FDAWarning”), but appear to be published by nonagency sources,
increasing the risk that readers will be confused.141
Even if one focuses solely on traditional publicity rather than on
new media or social media, this publicity now comes in multiple
formats. For example, in one case the CPSC had issued statements
about a product in an official agency news publication, a “Technical
Fact Sheet,” and in a traditional press release.142 The FDA alone uses
dozens of forms of publicity, as I catalog below.143 Some formats
have legal or regulatory significance—for example, FDA “recall”
announcements are different from “market withdrawal”
announcements—but many do not. And most audiences generally
do not appreciate these distinctions anyway.
The media can also turn an agency press release that is relatively
innocuous into something more damaging. For example, after the
PTO issued a press release announcing its new media campaign to
warn the public about invention submission promoters—quoting
one inventor who lost money dealing with an unnamed company—a
journalist contacted the inventor quoted and published stories that

139. See Food and Drug Administration, FACEBOOK, http://tinyurl.com/3vdunmt (last
visited Sept. 12, 2011).
140. See, e.g., U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, FACEBOOK, http://tinyurl.com/
3qhbde3 (last visited Sept. 12, 2011).
141. FDAWarning, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/FDAWarning (last visited Sept. 12,
2011). Note, however, that Twitter does indicate that certain Twitter feeds are “Verified
Accounts.”
142. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. CPSC, 414 F. Supp. 1047, 1050–51 (D. Del.
1976).
143. See infra Part IV.A.
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identified the company.144 Despite the PTO’s long-standing
skepticism of this company, it had not identified the company in its
press release.145 But once the information became public, the agency
lost the ability to control it. Today, investigative bloggers and other
online news sources can easily dig up this information.
D. Hyper-Responsive Capital Markets
The fourth major change since 1973 is that capital markets and
other audiences now process agency publicity swiftly and sometimes
hastily, raising the stakes for companies and decreasing the margin
for error. Stock prices quickly reflect new information—whether the
information is inaccurate, misleading, or simply misinterpreted.
The most noteworthy recent example of capital markets overresponding to bad information happened in 2008, when United
Airlines stock lost 76% of its value—roughly $1 billion—in just over
thirty minutes of trading. Bloomberg financial news mistakenly
republished a six-year-old story announcing that United would file
for bankruptcy.146 Bloomberg relied on third-party content providers
to find the latest news on companies, and one mistakenly reposted
the 2002 article after searching for 2008 articles on United using
Google’s search engine.147 Although Bloomberg posted a correction
just fifteen minutes later, and though United’s stock mostly
recovered,148 the incident showed that “the market apparently reacts
to a headline as much as anything else.”149 Capital markets today are
swift, decisive, and jittery. Moreover, it is doubtful that companies or
their investors could recover legal damages for an incident like
this.150 Aware of this problem, the regulatory branch of the New
144. Invention Submission Corp. v. Rogan, 357 F.3d 452, 455, 459 (4th Cir. 2004).
145. Id. at 456. But see Tozzi v. HHS, 271 F.3d 301, 307–10 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding
that manufacturer had standing to challenge an HHS report classifying a chemical as a
carcinogen because manufacturer could demonstrate actual and immediate injury-in-fact that
was fairly traceable to the agency’s report).
146. Frank Ahrens, 2002’s News, Yesterday’s Sell-Off, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2008, at A1.
147. Id.
148. NASDAQ halted trading on United’s stock after the 76% drop. After trading
reopened that day, United stock largely rebounded, though it ended the day 11.2% below the
previous day’s close and continued to trade lower several days after the incident. See CARLOS
CARVALHO, NICHOLAS KLAGGE, & EMANUEL MOENCH, THE PERSISTENT EFFECTS OF A
FALSE NEWS SHOCK: FED. RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK STAFF REPORT NO. 374, at 1 (revised
June 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1408169.
149. Ahrens, supra note 146, at A1.
150. The Communications Decency Act of 1996 states that “[N]o provider or user of an
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York Stock Exchange (NYSE) asked the SEC to give it advanced
notice of major enforcement announcements, or make such
announcements during non-trading hours, but the SEC denied this
request.151
Of course, we have long known that adverse agency publicity can
decimate stock prices. The United incident merely demonstrates that
mistakes can be amplified with today’s hyper-responsive capital
markets. Under the “efficient market hypothesis” (EMH), securities
prices rapidly reflect available information without bias.152 Early
studies testing this hypothesis “demonstrate[d] that the capital
market responds efficiently to an extraordinary variety of
information.”153 This response is quick enough that investors
possessing new information usually cannot really profit from it.154
Although EMH has long been the subject of an increasingly
sophisticated theoretical and empirical debate among legal and

interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.” Pub. L. No. 104–104, tit. I, § 509, 110
Stat. 137 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006)). Moreover, mere negligence would not
sustain a libel claim; the plaintiff must prove malicious intent. For another contemporary
example of hypersensitive investors, focusing on different legal issues, see Matrixx Initiatives
Inc. v. Siracuso, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1315–16 (2011), in which a drug company’s shares fell over
11% after a news report that the FDA was investigating adverse reactions from a common cold
medicine, then almost completely recovered after the company posted its press release that
(fraudulently) assured that its drug did not cause the adverse reactions. Moreover, Matrixx was
sued in consumer class action suits just days after the FDA published its original warning letter
to Matrixx on its website. See Sarah Taylor Roller, Raqiyyah R. Pippins, & Jennifer W. Ngai,
FDA’s Expanding Postmarket Authority to Monitor and Publicize Food and Consumer Health
Product Risks: The Need for Procedural Safeguards to Reduce “Transparency” Policy Harms in
the Post-9/11 Regulatory Environment, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 577, 592 n.63 (2009).
151. SEC OIG, supra note 25, at 65–71. The SEC declined NYSE’s request because it
was concerned about leaks and believed that announcements that have a big trading impact
would be sufficiently rare.
152. There are “strong,” “semi-strong,” and “weak” forms of this hypothesis. See Ian
Ayers & Stephen Choi, Internalizing Outsider Trading, 101 MICH. L. REV. 313, 318 n.18
(2002). In the strong form, the securities price reflects all information, including both public
and nonpublic. Id. Under the semi-strong form, the price reflects only public information. Id.
And under the weak form, it reflects only prior price information. Id. Empirical reviews tend to
support the weak or semi-strong variants. Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the
Crash, and the Fraud on the Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 911–12 n.11 (1989).
Eugene Fama first developed these variants. Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review
of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970).
153. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REV. 549, 551 (1984).
154. Id. at 555 (“‘[A]vailable information’ does not support profitable trading strategies
or arbitrage opportunities.”).
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financial scholars,155 most generally accept that stock prices fluctuate
in response to specific events. Indeed, “event studies” can use
econometrics to measure how stock prices respond after certain
events, “usually announcements of various corporate, legal, or
regulatory action or proposed action.”156 Event studies of regulation
tend to focus on the banking and financial industries, and on the
announcement of new regulations rather than announcements of
enforcement actions.157 But economists have been conducting event
studies for years,158 and event studies tied to particular regulatory
enforcement announcements could be used to appraise the
immediate effects of adverse publicity.
Beyond the immediate market reaction, the Internet acts as a
multiplier to adverse publicity,159 and the effects can linger. Word
can spread via online news aggregators, blogs, message boards, chat
rooms, and social media. These media and the twenty-four hour
news cycle propagate news bites that lack the nuance to convey the
nature of regulatory actions. Thus, agency statements can be
multiplied “without a corresponding right or remedy for those who
disagree with the agency.”160 Companies are rightly terrified that
their legal and regulatory violations—real or alleged—will be
broadcast.161 Although this may be the cost of doing business in a
regulated industry, agencies should not completely disregard these
concerns.
E. Counterforces?
Two counterforces might limit the risks that agencies will issue
adverse publicity that is erroneous, excessive, or misinterpreted. First,

155. See Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A
Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135 (2002), for an overview
of the debate.
156. Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part I: Technique and
Corporate Litigation, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 141, 144 (2002).
157. See Sanjai Bhagat & Robert Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part II: Empirical
Studies of Corporate Law, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 380, 410–14 (2002).
158. John J. Binder, Measuring the Effects of Regulation with Stock Price Data, 16 RAND
J. ECON. 167, 167–68 (1985); G. William Schwert, Using Financial Data to Measure Effects of
Regulation, 24 J.L. & ECON. 121, 122–24, 149–50 (1981).
159. O’Reilly, The 411 on 515, supra note 7, at 838.
160. Id.
161. Andrea A. Curcio, Painful Publicity: An Alternative Punitive Damage Sanction, 45
DEPAUL L. REV. 341, 343 (1996).
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agencies seem to be aware that they can saturate the public with
warnings and announcements. Back in 1973, Gellhorn noted that
consumers were relatively indifferent to warnings by the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) due to “notice
saturation,” given the frequent warnings relating to “almost every
make and model of automobile.”162 Today, agencies like the EPA,
FDA, FTC, and CPSC issue so many warnings that the public may
have developed some immunity to them, ironically rendering each
announcement less newsworthy. Frequent warnings by the NHTSA
“may have dissipated rather than heightened public interest.”163 The
FTC’s frequent notices similarly fell on numbed ears.164
Other agencies recognize the danger of notice saturation in
theory,165 though they continue to inundate the public. As noted in
my review of FDA publicity between 2004 and 2010, infra, the
FDA issued, on average, one new press release almost every business
day over a seven-year period.166 Agency announcements even
compete with each other for attention, and agencies sometimes
schedule big announcements on different days to maximize their
reach.167 Agencies like the FDA will publish multiple press releases
about important recalls—often with daily updates and titles that
declare their urgency—in order to distinguish them from run-of-themill announcements.168 Thus, although agencies seem to be aware of
notice saturation, it is not clear that it serves as a meaningful
restraint. Moreover, although the general public can be easily
saturated by notices, industry followers and the investing community
seem to pay attention to the large volume of agency announcements.

162. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1418.
163. Id. (noting, however, that FDA warnings tended to be less frequent and involved
scientific matter that the public was less likely to challenge).
164. Id. at 1427.
165. FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,436 (Mar. 4, 1977)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 2) (“[A]n excess of negative information could make the
public indifferent or insensitive to important warnings . . . .”); Wayne L. Pines, Regulatory
Letters, Publicity & Recalls, 31 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 352, 354 (1976) (“We know what
happened to the boy who cried ‘adulterated’ too often. He got himself and his message
‘adulterated.’”).
166. See infra Part IV.A.
167. See, e.g., SEC OIG, supra note 25, at 53.
168. For example, the FDA published eighteen separate press releases to publicize the
2006 E. coli outbreak. Press Announcements, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/
Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2006/default.htm?Page=2 (last visited Nov. 6, 2011).
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The second potential counterforce is that agencies now give
more careful scrutiny to the accuracy of information they publish and
the fairness of publishing it. As agencies began to release more
information to the public—both passively, as when responding to
FOIA requests and posting information on websites, and more
actively, by affirmatively issuing press releases169—concerns grew that
agencies were releasing information that was inaccurate or based on
less-than-perfect data.
So in 2001, Congress required agencies to ensure the “quality,
objectivity, utility, and integrity of information” that they
disseminate.170 The law required the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) to publish guidelines to ensure that information
released met minimum standards for accuracy and objectivity and to
create procedures that allowed parties to correct information if the
agency did not.171 However, after the OMB’s Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) proposed such guidelines, it explicitly
excluded agency press releases, as well as charges made by agencies
during adjudications.172 Although OIRA’s guidelines create a very
large exception, Professor James T. O’Reilly suggests that they might
make agency personnel more circumspect when issuing adverse
publicity, or maybe even require agencies to retract inaccurate or
misleading statements.173
Despite these developments, adverse publicity generally has
become even more coercive. As O’Reilly observes, “the forceful
assertion of agency condemnation may achieve more in a day than an
adjudicative proceeding could produce in many months of effort.”174

169. Professor O’Reilly distinguishes active versus passive publicity, noting the distinction
between an agency affirmatively publishing a press release and hosting a press conference and
“passively” posting information on its website. O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra
note 7, at 516–17.
170. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515(a), 114
Stat. 2763 (codified at 44 U.S.C. §§ 3504(d)(1), 3516 (2006)). Around the same time, the
American Bar Association’s House of Delegates adopted a recommendation that agencies
establish and publicize a process for correcting factual errors in information disseminated by
agencies. HOUSE OF DELEGATES 2001 ANNUAL MEETING, DAILY J. AM. BAR ASS’N, Report
No. 107c, at 7–11 (Aug. 6–7, 2001) (on file with author).
171. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001 § 515.
172. Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and
Integrity of Information Disseminated by Federal Agencies, 67 Fed. Reg. 369, 371 (Jan. 3,
2002).
173. O’Reilly, The 411 on 515, supra note 7, at 845, 849.
174. Id. at 837.
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We have long recognized that companies fear adverse publicity as
much as, if not more than, formal sanctions.175 And in the modern
era, when the Internet serves as a content multiplier, and when
capital markets seize information without verifying the details, the
velocity and severity of the fallout can be even greater.176 For these
reasons, the 1973 recommendations cannot be completely
superimposed today, and must be adapted to account for
technological developments.
IV. THE AFTERMATH: AGENCIES AND DISPUTES SINCE 1973
This Part evaluates what agencies did in response to the ACUS
recommendations—virtually nothing—and considers how agencies
have exercised their discretion and defended themselves in litigation,
examining twenty-six federal court opinions since 1973 that
challenged adverse agency publicity. I begin with an in-depth case
study of the FDA, and then briefly examine other agencies, including
the FTC, EPA, SEC, and CPSC. These agencies offer variations on
the FDA’s story, but confirm our generalized concerns. In short,
Congress should improve agencies’ statutory enforcement authority
so that the agency does not have to rely on publicity.
A. Case Study: The Food and Drug Administration
The FDA responded more than other agencies to the ACUS
recommendations. In 1977, the FDA proposed a rule on its use of
adverse publicity, attempting to codify and update its existing
policies.177 In the preamble to the proposal, the FDA acknowledged
that adverse publicity can interfere with criminal and civil actions and
“cause economic harm to both individuals and firms.”178 Of course,
the FDA had every reason to acknowledge these dangers after
causing the 1959 cranberry scare and other incidents.
The FDA’s proposed rule would have set publicity standards and
procedures that varied according to the nature of the FDA’s action,
delineating between criminal trials, civil litigation, investigations, and

175. Curcio, supra note 161, at 370; FISSE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 20, at 249.
176. Curcio, supra note 161, at 370.
177. FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,436, 12,440–41
(Mar. 4, 1977) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 2).
178. Id. at 12,436.
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administrative hearings.179 The rule would have provided advance
notice to the parties identified and would have allowed parties to
request that the FDA correct or retract its statements.180 Although
the thrust of the FDA’s proposal was to restrain itself, it emphasized
that it would reserve broad discretion to go beyond these selfimposed limits when necessary.181 Indeed, the preamble reads like
one long justification for issuing adverse publicity.182 The FDA even
stated that it would knowingly jeopardize a criminal action with
pretrial publicity if “needed to protect the public.”183
Ultimately, the FDA never finalized the proposed rule and
withdrew the rule fourteen years later without much explanation.184
In 1976, the FDA’s parent agency adopted publicity regulations,185
and the FDA generally follows this policy today.186
But despite being the only federal agency to formally respond to
the ACUS recommendations, the FDA continues to use adverse
publicity in ways that contravene those recommendations. The FDA
continues to rely on adverse publicity (or simply the threat thereof)
as a regulatory weapon.187 The FDA asserts the same justifications for
issuing adverse publicity that it articulated in its 1977 proposed rule,
188
as evidenced by its arguments in litigation. Like other agencies,
the FDA uses publicity for a number of purposes: to warn the public,
to notify the public of agency activities, and to clarify the agency’s
views and policies.189
179. Id. at 12,440–41.
180. Id. at 12,441.
181. Id. at 12,436–41.
182. The FDA’s proposal even defined “publicity” very narrowly as press releases, press
conferences, and media interviews intended to invite public attention. Id. at 12,440. Of
course, today FDA uses several additional vehicles for publicity.
183. FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. at 12,438.
184. Withdrawal of Certain Pre-1986 Proposed Rules, 56 Fed. Reg. 67,440, 67,446
(Dec. 30, 1991).
185. Release of Adverse Information to News Media, 41 Fed. Reg. 2 (Jan. 2, 1976) (to
be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 17).
186. See, e.g., JAMES T. O’REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION § 22:41 (3d ed.
2010).
187. Noah, supra note 7, at 890.
188. See, e.g., Banfi Products Corp. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 107, 124–26 (Fed. Cl.
1997); Fisher Bros. Sales, Inc. v. United States, 46 F.3d 279, 286–87 (3d Cir. 1995).
189. FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,436, 12,436 (Mar.
4, 1977) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 2). Although the FDA stated these purposes in a
proposed rule that was later withdrawn, these purposes generally reflect the agency’s approach.
FDA, RESEARCHING FDA WITH PUBLISHED PRIMARY SOURCES, http://tinyurl.com/4yr97c3
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The FDA is understandably protective of its duty to warn the
public of dangerous products and other health risks. In cases
challenging FDA publicity, the agency routinely emphasizes that it
must warn the public of health risks, even when acting on limited
information and scientific uncertainty.190 The FDA has long had to
warn the public in the face of such uncertainty. In 1971, the FDA
Commissioner Charles C. Edwards defended the agency’s decision
to warn the public before reaching a definitive conclusion that a
product in fact caused death or serious injury: “In dealing with life
or death problems like botulism, there are times when the public
interest demands action before the scientific case is complete. The
decision always must be made in favor of consumer protection.”191
Other FDA reporting and disclosure programs take a similar
stancerequiring disclosure of events before establishing causation
with scientific certainty, for example.192 Indeed, modern regulatory
agencies of all kinds must routinely operate amid scientific
uncertainty.193
As with adverse publicity by other agencies, FDA press releases
are generally reported by the trade press, the investment media,194
and often the national media. FDA publicity can be particularly
damaging partly because consumers traditionally have a very low
tolerance for perceived risks to the safety of food and drugs.195
It is difficult to locate every instance in which adverse publicity
by the FDA tangibly harmed the parties identified. Apart from legal
challenges that generate judicial opinions, few publications report
the aftermath. There are even fewer reported incidents affecting

(last updated May 5, 2009) (“The agency’s press releases and talk papers present FDA’s
viewpoints and policies on a wide variety of issues . . . .”).
190. See, e.g., Banfi, 40 Fed. Cl. at 124–26; Fisher Bros., 46 F.3d at 286–87.
191. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1415 n.142 (quoting HEW Release No. 71-67 (Nov. 1,
1971)).
192. For example, companies must report to the FDA adverse events “associated” with
their products even before the company may know for sure that its product caused the adverse
event. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (2011).
193. In a well-known contemporary example, the EPA claimed that it could not propose
regulations governing greenhouse gas emitting substances like carbon dioxide because it could
not conclude definitively that carbon dioxide qualifies as an air pollutant. Control of Emissions
from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,930–31 (Sep. 8, 2003).
The Supreme Court rejected this argument in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 533–34
(2007).
194. Levine, supra note 57, at 278.
195. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1410.
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individual firms, but some stand out. For example, one day after the
FDA publicized manufacturing violations at a medical device plant,
the company’s stock lost 35% of its value, and the company
subsequently suspended manufacturing and laid off 350
employees.196 In another incident, the FDA’s alert about a medical
device caused a national retail pharmacy chain to immediately
remove it from its stores.197
More recently, in March 2003, the FDA issued a public “Talk
Paper” to publicize its objections to a press release issued by the
drug company SuperGen that discussed its cancer drug
Mitozytrex.198 The FDA criticized SuperGen for exaggerating the
drug’s safety and effectiveness, and for minimizing its risks.199 The
FDA called SuperGen’s statements “misleading,” “demonstrably
false,” and “particularly egregious.”200 The company’s stock price fell
nearly 25% within hours.201
The FDA reportedly did not notify SuperGen of its objections
beforehand.202 Agency officials subsequently referred to the
SuperGen Talk Paper as a novel approach to “stop misleading
promotion.”203 But the FDA seemed to struggle internally with the
decision to publish it. The SuperGen Talk Paper was the first time in
17 years that the FDA voiced its objection through its own publicity
rather than through a more traditional Warning Letter.204 And the
FDA did not publish the Talk Paper until four months after
SuperGen issued its press release.205 As my coauthors and I noted in
196. James G. Dickinson, Publicity as Punishment, MED. DEVICE & DIAGNOSTIC
INDUSTRY 24 (Jan. 1992); O’REILLY, supra note 186 at § 22.42.
197. FDA QUARTERLY REPORT, FIRST QUARTER 1987, at 20 (1987); O’REILLY, supra
note 186, at § 22.42.
198. FDA, supra note 1.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. FDA Responds in Kind to SuperGen, supra note 3, at 6; Vodra et al., supra note 3, at
649.
202. Vodra et al., supra note 3, at 649.
203. DDMAC Looking for More “Creative” Enforcement Actions, FDAWEBVIEW (June
18, 2003), http://www.fdaweb.com (quoting DDMAC Director Tom Abrams) (last accessed
Sept. 12, 2011).
204. Vodra et al., supra note 3, at 649. Traditionally, Talk Papers were ostensibly aimed
at FDA personnel, while Warning Letters were notifications to specific private parties notifying
them that the agency believes the party is violating the FDCA. FDA, REGULATORY
PROCEDURES MANUAL at Exhibit 4-1 (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/ICECI/ComplianceManuals/RegulatoryProceduresManual/UCM176965.pdf.
205. Vodra et al., supra note 3, at 649. Moreover, the FDA later republished the Talk
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a prior article,206 the FDA used the Talk Paper to reach the same
audience as SuperGen’s press release and to avoid giving SuperGen
procedural rights associated with formal enforcement actions. It is
not clear why the FDA did not notify SuperGen of its objections
beforehand, particularly because four months had passed and there
did not appear to be a health emergency or a risk of significant
economic loss that might justify it. The Talk Paper would have
violated the FDA’s proposed 1977 rule in several ways, although in
the agency’s defense “Talk Papers” would not be covered under the
rule’s definition of “publicity.”207 Nevertheless, the SuperGen Talk
Paper illustrates how easily agencies can name and shame companies.
Of course, the FDA has more explicit statutory authority to issue
publicity than most other agencies.208 Section 705 of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) allows the FDA to publish
“judgments, decrees, and court orders” enforcing the Act, including
the nature and disposition of the action.209 But § 705 also bestows
broader authority on the FDA to disseminate information about
regulated products that involve an “imminent danger to health or
gross deception of the consumer.”210 This latter provision clarifies
that nothing prohibits the FDA from publishing the results of
investigations.211 Notably, this language seems to bless the FDA
practice of announcing fully adjudicated actions, rather than
preliminary actions, unless there is imminent danger.
The FDA has long interpreted § 705 as granting it explicit
authority to issue adverse publicity212—a reasonable assertion given
the statute’s plain language.213 But the FDA has also asserted that it
has implicit authority to issue publicity because the Public Health
Paper, removing a disclaimer on the original Talk Paper that noted that the agency uses Talk
Papers to guide agency personnel but uses press releases to inform the general public. Id. at
649 n.138. Apparently, the FDA was aware that it was using the Talk Paper more like a press
release.
206. Id. at 648–50.
207. FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,436 (March 4,
1977) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 2).
208. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1408.
209. FDCA § 705(a), 21 U.S.C. § 375(a) (2006).
210. FDCA § 705(b), 21 U.S.C. § 375(b).
211. Id.
212. FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. at 12,437.
213. Some also argue that the 1990 Safe Medical Devices Act enhanced FDA’s statutory
authority to issue publicity by granting the FDA additional authority to warn about device
hazards. O’REILLY, supra note 186, at § 22.41 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360h(e)(2)(B)).
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Service Act requires the agency to make public information about
the products that it regulates.214 Finally, the FDA has justified its
discretionary authority to issue publicity under the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Barr v. Matteo, which “recognized that Federal agencies
have implicit authority to issue public statements respecting agency
policy on matters of wide public interest.”215
Thus, Congress clearly has granted the FDA discretion to issue
adverse publicity. The question is whether FDA abuses its discretion.
The FDA has long viewed its statutory powers expansively. When
Peter Barton Hutt was Chief Counsel for the agency, he declared
that the FDCA “must be regarded as a constitution” that gives the
FDA broad discretion to protect the public health as necessary.216
And in subsequent legal challenges to FDA publicity, the agency
argued that it had almost unreviewable discretion to warn the
public.217 Of course, scholars and courts have long been suspicious of
such claims.218 The FDA enjoys several other statutory enforcement
powers, such as the power to seize products and obtain
injunctions,219 but these powers “depend on court approval and are
costly to administer, time-consuming, and . . . often ineffective.”220
Thus, the FDA sometimes relies on the threat of adverse publicity to
encourage parties to comply with its demands.
Today, the FDA uses nonbinding guidance documents and
employee manuals to address its use of publicity. Its Regulatory
Procedures Manual states that the FDA Office of Public Affairs is
responsible for preparing and approving press releases and Talk
Papers.221 The FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research
(CDER) publishes a Manual of Policies and Procedures that
articulates policies for issuing press releases, Talk Papers, and other

214. FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. at 12,437 (citing Public
Health Service Act §§ 301, 310, 42 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242o).
215. FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. at 12,437 (citing Barr
v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959)).
216. Hutt, supra note 62, at 178.
217. See infra Part V.C.2.a.
218. See, e.g., Noah, supra note 7, at 911–12; Lars Noah, The Little Agency That Could
(Act with Indifference to Constitutional and Statutory Strictures), 93 CORNELL L. REV. 901
(2008).
219. FDCA §§ 302, 304, 21 U.S.C. §§ 332, 334.
220. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1407.
221. REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 204, at § 8-8 (2010).
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forms of publicity,222 describing in detail procedures for drafting and
clearing these documents. It even specifies procedures for resolving
disputes within the agency that might arise when approving
publicity, but does not mention any procedures available to parties
outside the agency.223 In fact, the Manual addresses virtually none of
the recommendations urged by Gellhorn and ACUS, and does not
even seem to incorporate FDA’s proposed rule from 1977.224
In the preamble to its 1977 proposed rule, the FDA stated that
press releases “ordinarily are personally approved by the Assistant
Commissioner for Public Affairs and the Commissioner.”225 But the
proposed rule included no definite procedures for approving and
releasing publicity.226 Today, press releases require a relatively low
level of clearance within the FDA compared to other forms of
publicity, and are disseminated by public relations personnel and on
FDA’s website.227
The FDA’s 1977 proposal also stated that private parties could
file a citizen petition asking the Assistant Commissioner for Public
Affairs to retract or correct publicity, and included procedures for
expediting requests.228 Today, parties can still file citizen petitions
with the agency under separate regulations,229 but the FDA specifies
no separate procedures for parties to object to publicity. Citizen
petitions may not receive timely responses, and the FDA does not
describe any expedited procedures.
The FDA sometimes does not notify the private party or give it
an opportunity to respond to adverse publicity, although the agency

222. CDER, MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES (MAPP) 4112.1, CDER/FDA
PRESS OFFICE INTERACTIONS IN THE PREPARATION AND CLEARANCE OF WRITTEN
DOCUMENTS FOR THE PUBLIC (2001), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDER/ManualofPoliciesProcedures/ucm073021.pdf.
223. CDER MAPP 4112.1, supra note 222, at 3–6.
224. FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,436, 12,436 (Mar.
4, 1977) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 2).
225. Id. at 12,437.
226. See id.
227. Although press releases are issued by departments within FDA’s five centers, Talk
Papers are issued at the agency level, and Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) are issued by the
FDA’s centers. CDER MAPP 4112.1, supra note 222, at 1–2.
228. FDA Administrative Policies and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. at 12,441 (to be codified
21 C.F.R. pt. 2.746).
229. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. 10.30 (2011).
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believes that targeted parties are often aware that they are on the
agency’s radar.230
The FDA is often willing to notify parties beforehand, but only
in general terms stating that the agency will be issuing publicity; the
agency “does not negotiate with the company about the text of the
FDA announcement,” “[n]or will FDA share the text of a press
communication with a company in advance,”231 on the grounds that
doing so “would be inconsistent with the principle of equal access to
public information” under FOIA.232 Sometimes, advance notice gives
the party an opportunity to issue its own publicity in response; other
times, the FDA believes advance notice would be inappropriate, such
as when it initiates an enforcement action.233
Although the FDA does not routinely publicize the enforcement
actions it initiates—such as issuing a Warning Letter or even signing
a consent decree234—it does announce a significant number of these
actions in press releases, and posts virtually all of them on its website.
The FDA also recognizes that a press release can be more effective
than formal enforcement in some cases, and is more likely to
publicize “an enforcement action against a large multinational
corporation” or one involving “a well-recognized product or
brand.”235
The FDA has defended its discretion to publicly disclose
enforcement actions already taken,236 and frequently issues press
releases announcing consent decrees, settlements, judgments, and
criminal sentences. But the FDA also regularly issues press releases
announcing preliminary matters like investigations, civil complaints,
and criminal charges, and indictments. Sometimes, the FDA will
update previously issued announcements stating that a court has
entered a consent decree of permanent injunction. But I did not find
any updates announcing decisions favorable to defendants.237
230. FDA Administrative Policies and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. at 12,439.
231. Levine, supra note 57, at 277.
232. FDA Administrative Policies and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. at 12,439.
233. Id.
234. Levine, supra note 57, at 277.
235. Id.
236. See, e.g., Protection of Human Subjects; Standards for Institutional Review Boards
for Clinical Investigations, 46 Fed. Reg. 8958, 8974 (Jan. 27, 1981) (rejecting a public
comment stating that publicly disclosing FDA disqualifications of Institutional Review Boards
would make it difficult for the IRB to recruit).
237. Note that in a bizarre press release, the FDA stated that it had posted a Warning
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In general, FDA press releases sound less threatening than
Warning Letters, in which the FDA typically alleges that a company
has violated the statute, regulations, or both, and asks the company
to take immediate remedial action or face a formal enforcement
action.238 Moreover, in the past, the FDA’s Warning Letters stated
that it would recommend to other federal agencies not to award
contracts for affected products.239 Although press releases did not
contain similar threats, both types of documents can constitute a
form of punishment against companies that the FDA suspects are
violating its regulations.
I surveyed the FDA’s website to determine how frequently the
agency issues publicity and in what forms. My review found that the
FDA uses a large number of forms and formats for publicity. In
addition to traditional press releases, the FDA also uses television
and radio appearances, speeches at conferences, and even
congressional testimony.240 But FDA publicity, broadly construed,
comes in many more forms, perhaps reflecting the agency’s basic
philosophy that “the public’s business must be and will be
conducted in public.”241 Again, the Obama administration has
emphasized transparency by agencies, but not all transparency is
benign. Some authors call it “adverse transparency.”242

Letter regarding several Procter & Gamble over-the-counter drugs by mistake, attributing the
mistake to “an internal systems error.” FDA clarified that “no warning letter has been sent to
Procter & Gamble.” Note to Correspondents, FDA, Procter & Gamble Warning Letter Posted
in Error (Oct. 15, 2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/
PressAnnouncements/2009/ucm186832.htm.
238. See, e.g., Den-Mat Corp. v. FDA, No. MJG-92-444, 1992 WL 208962, at *1 (D.
Md. Aug. 17, 1992).
239. Id.
240. Levine, supra note 57, at 278.
241. FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,436 (Mar. 4, 1977)
(to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 2) (internal quotation marks omitted).
242. Roller et al., supra note 150, at 597.
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I found FDA news announcements identifying particular
companies or products under the following titles:
•
•
•
•
•

Media Transcript (of press briefings);
Press Announcement;
Press Release;
Talk Paper243; and
Warning Letter.244

Moreover, the FDA labels its warnings about specific products
and companies in many different ways, some of which have legal
significance and some of which do not:245
Advice for Patients;
Consumer Updates;
Field Action Notification;
Field Correction;
Frequently Asked Questions;
Important Information;
Important Customer
Notification;
• Important Notice;
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Market Withdrawal;
Notice of Field Correction;
Notice to Readers;
Product Withdrawal;
Public Health Advisory;
Public Health Notification;
Recall;
Recovery Notice;
Safety Communication;

243. The public has long been confused about what the FDA Talk Papers signify. FDA
Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. at 12,436. The FDA tried to clarify that
Talk Papers are aimed internally at FDA personnel to ensure that their responses to public
questions are uniform, attaching the disclaimer that Talk Papers are “For Internal Distribution
Only.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (“‘Talk Papers’ are not considered publicity
subject to this proposal.”). Later Talk Papers included the disclaimer that “FDA Talk Papers
are prepared by the Press Office to guide FDA personnel in responding with consistency and
accuracy to questions from the public on subjects of current interest.” FDA, Talk Paper T0162: FDA Strengthens Warning for Droperidol (Dec. 5, 2001), available at
http://tinyurl.com/3blyrbd. The FDA subsequently changed its position, noting that
although Talk Papers were intended to provide more detailed information to guide agency
staff, Talk Papers were “actively disseminated to the media” and the intended audience was the
“[g]eneral [p]ublic.” CDER MAPP 4112.1, supra note 222, at 1. As noted above, the FDA
has published Talk Papers on its website that publicly criticize regulated companies. The FDA
discontinued its use of Talk Papers in October 2005. See, e.g., Food, Nutrition and Cosmetics
Announcements, FDA.GOV, http://tinyurl.com/4yk83mt (last updated Apr. 25, 2011).
244. Newsroom, FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/default.htm
(last updated Sept. 1, 2011).
245. For example, a product “withdrawal” and “correction” have different regulatory
significance than a “recall.” Guidance for Industry: Product Recalls, Including Removals and
Corrections,
FDA.GOV
(Nov.
3,
2003),
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/
IndustryGuidance/ucm129259.htm.
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• Important Safety Information;
• Information Alert;
• Information for Health Care
Professionals;

• Urgent Instruction
Correction;
• Urgent Removal; and
• Urgent Notification.

Of course, the FDA often finds it necessary to announce product
recalls, and this practice demonstrates the Catch-22 for agencies
dealing with imperfect information and scientific uncertainty. On
one hand, Gellhorn originally found that not only did the FDA
arguably not have clear statutory authority to require recalls, but that
the agency publicized recalls in excessive and damaging ways.246
Other authors have been similarly critical of the FDA’s use of recalls
in lieu of sanctions more explicitly authorized by statute.247
On the other hand, courts generally protect the FDA’s discretion
to warn the public about potential health hazards, which includes
notifying the public of recalls and other product removals.248 To its
credit, the FDA does not publicize all recalls, but reserves publicity
for products that pose the most serious risks.249 Current FDA
regulations call for manufacturers to cooperate with the FDA in
publicizing the recall, noting that the FDA “in consultation with the
recalling firm will ordinarily issue such publicity” itself, or at least
provide written comments on the firm’s own publicity.250
Aside from affirmatively issuing publicity, the FDA more
passively makes negative information about companies public on its
website, without drawing much attention to it. For example, it posts
formal legal complaints, Warning Letters (which it sometimes
publicizes), inspectional observations, and other documents stating
objections that have yet to be resolved or adjudicated.251 In its 1977
246. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1410–16.
247. Noah, supra note 7, at 874–75, 888.
248. See, e.g., Sperling & Schwartz, Inc. v. United States, 218 Ct. Cl. 625, 626–27 (Ct.
Cl. 1978) (holding the FDA had a rational basis for warning public through press releases
about excessive lead in dishware).
249. For Consumers, FDA 101: Product Recalls—From First Alert to Effectiveness Checks,
FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm049070.htm (last
updated Sept. 9, 2011).
250. 21 C.F.R. § 7.42(b)(2) (2010). Note that for Class I recalls, the most serious type
of recall, it is the FDA’s policy to give “the recalling firm the first opportunity to prepare and
issue publicity concerning its recall.” REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 204, at
§ 7-7-3.
251. Newsroom, FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/default.htm
(last updated Sept. 9, 2011); Inspections, Compliance, Enforcement, and Criminal
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proposal, the FDA tried to distinguish publicity that it intended to
distribute to the mass media for further consumption from other
notifications meant to educate or simply notify the public.252 But this
distinction means very little when the FDA posts thousands of
documents on its website that are reported by the media and trade
press—without any specific efforts by the FDA to publicize them.
Even more recent policies try to distinguish between information
intended for the general public and for the media,253 although it is
not clear what really distinguishes the two today.254
As part of my review of FDA publicity, I tried measuring how
frequently the FDA publicizes negative or adverse information about
private parties, and the proportion that announced preliminary or
pending actions rather than final, adjudicated ones. I reviewed all
“Press Announcements” archived on the FDA’s Newsroom page,
from 2004 to 2010.255

Investigations, FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/default.htm (last updated Jan. 25,
2011). See Levine, supra note 57, at 278.
252. FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,436, 12,437 (Mar.
4, 1977) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 2) (delineating publicity from the FDA Consumer
magazine, the FDA Drug Bulletin, and other publications that report actions taken by FDA).
253. CDER MAPP 4112.1, supra note 222, at 1–2.
254. The chart on CDER MAPP 4112.1, supra note 222, at 1–2, generally shows that
information intended for the media is disseminated by the FDA’s press office and information
intended for the general public is posted on FDA’s website, although the two overlap when
FDA issues press releases, talk papers, and notes to correspondents.
255. Newsroom, FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/default.htm
(last updated Sept. 13, 2011).
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Year

Total
releases256

2004

160

2005

144

2006

254

2007

229

2008

174

2009

282

2010

299

Total

1542

(1) Identify
private
party or
product?257
73/160
(46%)
80/144
(56%)
161/254
(63%)
157/229
(69%)
121/174
(70%)
198/282
(70%)
219/299
(73%)
1009/1542
(65%)

(2)
Negative
or
adverse?258
54/73
(74%)
50/80
(63%)
82/161
(51%)
89/157
(57%)
65/121
(54%)
130/198
(66%)
152/219
(69%)
622/1009
(62%)

(3)
Preliminary
or pending
action?259
40/54
(74%)
45/50
(90%)
71/82
(87%)
70/89
(79%)
52/65
(80%)
80/130
(62%)
105/152
(69%)
463/622
(74%)

Percent of
total that
were (1),
(2) and (3)
40/160
(25%)
45/144
(31%)
71/254
(28%)
70/229
(31%)
52/174
(30%)
80/282
(28%)
105/299
(35%)
463/1542
(30%)

As illustrated on the chart, the FDA issued 1542 press
announcements between 2004 and 2010, equating to almost one
every business day. Although O’Reilly observed that “[t]he FDA
does not overly rely upon publicity” and uses it only sparingly,260 my
review suggests otherwise.
256. These numbers exclude duplicate press releases published in foreign languages.
257. Column (1) counts the number of press releases that identify a specific product,
company, and/or individual in the title or body. Note that some press releases refer to types or
categories of products without identifying specific products or manufacturers by name. I did
not include these press releases in Column (1).
258. Column (2) refers to press releases that include negative or adverse information
about a specific company, product, or individual. For example, FDA announcements that the
agency has recalled a product or issued a Warning Letter are negative actions. The vast
majority of positive announcements involve the FDA approving or clearing new products to
market.
259. Column (3) refers to press releases that announce some sort of preliminary
determination or pending agency action that has not reached a final, determinative conclusion.
I counted recalls, seizures, Warning Letters, and import alerts as preliminary or pending actions
because they are often based on preliminary information and have not been subject to agency
adjudication or other final determination, even if a company initiated the recall voluntarily.
Companies often initiate voluntary recalls in cooperation with, or with pressure from, the FDA.
260. O’REILLY, supra note 186, at §§ 22.42, 22.43 n.1 (citing Pines, supra note 165, at
354) (noting that the FDA issued fewer than 50 press releases each year as of 1976, but
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My review also finds that 65% of FDA press announcements
during this period identify a specific product, company, or person
(Column (1)). Of these, 62% are negative or adverse in some way
(Column (2)). And of these, 74% announce a preliminary or pending
action by the FDA that has not been fully resolved or adjudicated
(Column (3)). For an agency that seems to appreciate that adverse
publicity announcing preliminary actions can unfairly damage
companies, the FDA certainly does not seem to shy away from the
practice.
Of course, the FDA can justify many of these adverse,
preliminary announcements as protecting the public health, such as
during a recall. And many other matters ultimately result in
successful adjudications or settlements for the agency. Thus, the
chart above is not meant to imply that the FDA is not justified in
making most of these announcements. But the sheer volume of such
announcements (463 out of 1542) raises the risk of errors or abuse.
And no legal constraints deter errors or abuse, apart from internal
self-discipline, such as the agency’s willingness to maintain legitimacy
with repeat players, its desire to keep its enforcement powder dry,
and its respect for due process, among other considerations.
Compounding matters, the FDA consistently argues that its
publicity is not subject to judicial review.261 Like Warning Letters,
which the FDA defines by regulation as informal enforcement
actions,262 the FDA considers adverse publicity to be a statutorily
authorized form of informal enforcement.263 One court noted that
the FDA cannot have it both ways, after the agency targeted
particular companies through a publicity campaign:

acknowledging that “the number may have increased in recent years”).
261. Noah, supra note 7, at 887 (noting that only once has a court allowed a challenge
to an FDA warning letter to proceed). See, e.g., Den-Mat Corp. v. FDA, Civ. A. No. MJG-92444, 1992 WL 208962, at *1, 5 (D. Md. Aug. 17 1992) (denying FDA’s motion to dismiss
an action claiming that an FDA warning letter and related publicity against a company were
not final agency actions, requiring instead a further hearing on the company’s standing to sue).
262. 21 C.F.R. § 100.2(j)(1) (1993). The FDCA states that the Secretary of Health and
Human Services need not report “minor violations” for prosecution “whenever he believes
that the public interest will be adequately served by a suitable written notice or warning.” 21
U.S.C. § 336 (2006). FDA “Warning Letters” typically identify alleged regulatory violations
and ask the identified company to respond and take corrective action within a certain period of
time, or else face formal enforcement. REGULATORY PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 204,
at § 4-1.
263. State Enforcement Provisions of the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990,
58 Fed. Reg. 2457, 2457 (Jan. 6, 1993).
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This Court cannot now say that a focused effort such as this may be
is immune from judicial review because the agency says its decision
is tentative and open to reconsideration. If the FDA’s view is, in
fact, so tentative that it is not yet ripe for judicial review, it may not
be appropriate to take actions which directly result in harm to those
private parties who dare to disagree with them.264

The court also objected that it would be “inherently unfair” to
allow the FDA to use coercive methods such as threatening Warning
Letters and adverse publicity to “‘enforce’ its determination without
allowing the affected party an opportunity to prove that the FDA’s
position is wrong.”265 But that is exactly the agency’s approach. And
like other agencies, the FDA frequently invokes sovereign immunity
and executive privilege to defend its use of adverse publicity.266 As a
former lawyer in the FDA Chief Counsel’s Office cautions, “there is
relatively little a company can do in most circumstances to
significantly diminish the effect of [an FDA] release.”267
These problems can be addressed in several ways. The agency has
long struggled with insufficient resources and personnel to enforce
its regulations.268 And its previously limited statutory authority to
require mandatory as opposed to voluntary recalls for things like
food products is well known.269 It remains to be seen whether
increased funding and enhanced statutory authority will reduce the
incentive to wield adverse publicity. Either way, the FDA is a
fascinating case study, given its responsibilities to alert the public
about certain health risks.
264. Den-Mat, 1992 WL 208962, at *5. The court noted the plaintiff’s allegations that
the FDA’s public stance against the manufacturer “caused a significant decrease in sales, with
an accompanying erosion of customer goodwill.” Id. at *4.
265. Id. at *5.
266. See, e.g., Ajay Nutrition Foods, Inc. v. FDA, 378 F. Supp. 210 (D.N.J. 1974), aff’d,
513 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1975).
267. Levine, supra note 57, at 277.
268. See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING
AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC 151–76 (Alina Baciu et al. eds., 2006);
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK 4
(2007).
269. Subcomm. on Regulations and Healthcare: Hearing on Impact of Food Recalls on
Small Businesses Before the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 111th Cong. 52 (2009) (statement of
Steven M. Solomon, Assistant Comm’r for Compliance Policy, Office of Regulatory Affairs,
Food and Drug Admin., Dep’t of Health and Human Servs.). Note, however, that in 2011,
President Obama signed the Food Safety Modernization Act, which for the first time
authorized the FDA to use mandatory recalls for all food products. Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124
Stat. 3885 (2011) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 2201 et seq. (Supp. 2011)).
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B. Other Agencies
Other agencies offer variations on the FDA’s story. For example,
the FTC restrains itself through written policies, and the CPSC
adheres to clear congressional directives. The following looks at how
other agencies fare compared to the FDA.
1. Federal Trade Commission
In 1973, Gellhorn lauded the FTC for having “the most
sophisticated publicity policies and practices of the regulatory and
executive agencies examined in [his] study.”270 Not only had the
D.C. Circuit upheld the FTC’s approach,271 but the FTC was one of
the only agencies to articulate its policies “in continually evolving
agency rules, manuals, and guidebooks.”272 The FTC enunciated
written policies in its Public Information Policy Guidebook, which
made its policies clear to both agency personnel and the public.273
Gellhorn praised the FTC’s policies as “both sensible and sensitive,”
representing “a thoughtful attempt to balance administrative
efficiency, the public’s need for warning, and private interests.”274
The agency has also received judicial blessing to issue publicity,275
and although it does not seem to have explicit statutory authority to
do so, it probably has implicit authority.276
270. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1388.
271. In FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc., 404 F.2d 1308, 1309 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), the FTC issued news releases announcing that it had “reason to believe” that
several companies were engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices.
272. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1388.
273. Id. (citing FTC, PUBLIC INFORMATION POLICY GUIDEBOOK (1972)).
274. Id.
275. See, e.g., Indus. Safety Equip. Ass’n v. EPA, 837 F.2d 1115, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(stating that agency publications promote congressional intent); Cinderella Schools, 404 F.2d at
1314 (holding that 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) authorized the agency to issue factual press releases
concerning pending adjudications).
276. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1388–93; Noah, supra note 7, at 890–91. The FTC has a
strong case for implicit authority to issue publicity under 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (2006), which
states that the FTC has the authority “[t]o make public from time to time such portions of
information obtained by it hereunder as are in the public interest . . . and to provide for the
publication of its reports and decisions in such form and manner as may be best adapted for
public information and use.” The D.C. Circuit stated in Cinderella Schools that “Congress
obviously has long been aware of and acquiesced in the Commission’s press release
procedures.” 404 F.2d at 1314. Moreover, the court in FTC v. Freecom Communications
stated that § 46(f) “specifically authorize[s] the FTC to make news releases.” 966 F. Supp.
1066, 1067 (D. Utah 1997). Finally, the FTC Act allows the FTC to propose a complaint and
notify the subject that it intends to file it unless the subject agrees to discontinue allegedly
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Notwithstanding the agency’s efforts, since 1973 the FTC has
been one of the most frequently sued agencies. Even so, courts
almost uniformly interpret the FTC Act as granting the FTC broad
discretion to issue publicity.277 Rarely do parties charge that the FTC
violated its own policies and procedures, and when they do, courts
generally reject these challenges out of hand, without much
analysis.278
The most recent federal case addressing agency publicity allowed
the D.C. Circuit to articulate its latest thinking. In Trudeau v.
FTC,279 the court resolved a long legal battle between the FTC and
Kevin Trudeau, an infomercial entrepreneur who marketed various
products as treatments for a wide range of medical conditions, like
cancer and obesity.280 The FTC had filed several complaints alleging
that Trudeau had engaged in false and deceptive trade practices.281 A
final order prohibited Trudeau from participating in infomercials,
with some narrow exceptions for books or other publications not
marketing his services.282 Five days after the court entered the final
order, the FTC described it in a press release on its website.283
Trudeau sued the FTC after it refused to remove the press
release from its website, arguing that the press release exceeded the
agency’s statutory authority, mischaracterized the settlement, and
retaliated against Trudeau for criticizing the FTC.284 He claimed that
several aspects of the press release mischaracterized the nature of the
settlement and obscured the fact that Trudeau never admitted to—
and no adjudicator had ever found—any wrongdoing.285 For
example, the press release was titled “Kevin Trudeau Banned from
Infomercials” and quoted an FTC employee saying that Trudeau had
violative practices—a much less public type of pressure. 15 U.S.C. § 45(b); 16 C.F.R. §§ 2.31,
2.32 (2001).
277. See, e.g., Freecom, 966 F. Supp. at 1067.
278. See, e.g., FTC v. Magui Publishers, Inc., No. CV 89-3818-RSWL, 1990 WL
132719 at *1–2 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (rejecting out of hand an allegation that FTC violated
Operating Manual Ch. 17 § 2.5 because the FTC’s publicity largely tracked the preliminary
injunction the agency had obtained).
279. Trudeau v. FTC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2005), aff’d, 456 F.3d 178 (D.C.
Cir. 2006).
280. 456 F.3d at 180.
281. 384 F. Supp. 2d at 283–85.
282. Id. at 284.
283. Id. at 284–85.
284. Id. at 282–83.
285. Id. at 285–87; 456 F.3d at 194–97.
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“mislead American consumers for years” and was a “habitual false
advertiser.”286 Trudeau noted that several media reports
characterized the settlement as a “ban” and his $2 million payment
as a “fine.”287 He also argued that a Google search for “Kevin
Trudeau” returned the FTC’s press release as the second result,
which became the first result returned by the time the district court
wrote its opinion.288 Trudeau also claimed that the publicity hurt his
ability to contract with vendors and market his publications, citing
an incident in which Ed McMahon backed out of promoting a
Trudeau book.289 Trudeau asked the district court to require the
FTC to clarify in the press release that the allegations were only
allegations, and that the FTC had imposed no fines or penalties.290
The court granted the FTC’s motion to dismiss on two grounds:
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the press release
was not “final agency action” under APA § 704, and Trudeau could
not state a valid cause of action.291
Although the court recognized that agency publicity could
constitute a sanction and thus qualify as final agency action under
the APA in certain circumstances, no court had ever encountered
such a case, and the FTC’s press release about Trudeau did not
qualify.292 Trudeau did not produce evidence showing that the
agency exceeded its authority, nor could he identify any “discernible
harm.”293
The D.C. Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling, though it
disagreed that the court lacked jurisdiction.294 The D.C. Circuit
assumed that Trudeau could assert several causes of action, but
found that his allegations could not sustain them as a matter of law
because the press release simply was not false or misleading.295 The

286. 384 F. Supp. 2d at 285; 456 F.3d at 195.
287. 384 F. Supp. 2d at 285–86; 456 F.3d at 196.
288. 384 F. Supp. 2d at 285 n.3. Indeed, this has become a major area of concern for
companies and individuals alike. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION:
GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 9–13 (2007) (discussing Google’s search
results and their interminable memory).
289. 384 F. Supp. 2d at 286.
290. Id at 287.
291. Id. at 288–90.
292. Id. at 289–90.
293. Id. at 293, 296–97.
294. Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 183–87 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
295. Id. at 191–97.
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court found that “no reasonable person could misinterpret the press
release” given the clarifying language in the subtitle and body, the
accurate descriptions of the action, the disclaimer reemphasizing the
nature of the settlement, and the links to the full documents,
including settlement order.296 “In the end,” the D.C. Circuit found
that the case “[came] down to whether Trudeau has the right to take
a red pencil to the language of the FTC’s press release,” concluding
that “[h]e does not.”297
The Trudeau case illustrates a few points. First, even agencies
with written policies like the FTC will sometimes issue publicity that
private parties claim is unfair and punitive. Second, it can be difficult
to prove that agency publicity was intended to punish or sanction.
And third, even though the public (and markets) react to a headline,
courts will go beyond the headline in asking whether “a reasonable
person could misinterpret” the announcement. But one cannot help
but wonder how many announcements would struggle to meet that
standard with the truncated announcements typical of new media.
2. Environmental Protection Agency
Like the FDA, the EPA often justifies its announcements as
necessary to protect public health. Also like the FDA, the EPA does
not voluntarily restrain its discretion in ways that would address the
long-standing concerns with publicity. The EPA does designate
agency personnel to field objections that data entered on its website
are incorrect.298 EPA staff marks such data with yellow flag icons.299
But this policy does not extend to EPA announcements or other
forms of publicity.
The EPA has routinely publicized cases that it refers to the
Justice Department for criminal prosecution, despite the Justice
Department’s policy of being much more circumspect in making
public statements before trial.300 Like FDA officials, EPA officials
296. Id. at 196–97.
297. Id. at 180.
298. O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 7, at 514, 533–36.
299. Id. at 534.
300. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1402. Like many agencies, the EPA must rely on the
Justice Department to prosecute criminal violations. Id. at 1401–03 (noting that EPA’s
publicity during pretrial criminal cases made at least one U.S. Attorney “furious”). However,
the Justice Department itself is not always so careful. For example, in U.S. v. Abbott
Laboratories, 505 F.2d 565 (4th Cir. 1974), Justice Department prosecutors prepared a press
release and gave media interviews that interfered with a fair trial for individual defendants
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recognize that strategic use of information “can be a supplement,
sometimes even an alternative, to regulation” and can change how
regulated parties behave.301
Congress has shown some sensitivity to disclosures about private
parties by the EPA, but in only one narrow context. In 1976, when
Congress passed the Toxic Substances Control Act, it made it a
crime for EPA employees to disclose information that private
manufacturers had submitted to the agency and designated as
confidential, unless the agency gave them prior notice.302 The Act
requires the EPA to notify the private party thirty days before
disseminating the information,303 unless the agency finds that
disclosing the information is “necessary to protect health or the
environment against an unreasonable risk of injury,” in which case
the EPA must provide fifteen days notice.304 If the EPA believes
there is an “imminent, unreasonable risk of injury to health or the
environment,” the prior notice requirement is cut to twenty-four
hours.305 Again, this policy applies to information designated as
confidential, but the procedures might form the basis for broader
EPA policies addressing publicity.
Another similarity with the FDA is that the EPA often finds it
useful to publish its opinions about products, manufacturers, and
overall regulatory conditions. For example, in one case the EPA and
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
published a “guide” recommending the use of two specific
respirators to prevent inhaling asbestos, and recommending against
using eleven other respirators, even though the eleven others had
been federally certified.306 The D.C. Circuit held that the guide,
despite being adverse to the eleven respirator manufacturers, was not
a sanction or another form of reviewable “agency action” under the
APA.307

accused of distributing tainted pharmaceuticals.
301. Envtl. Law Inst., West Tower Philosopher, ENVTL. F., July–Aug. 1998, at 36 (quoting
former EPA General Counsel Jonathan Cannon).
302. Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, Tit. I § 14, 90 Stat. 2034
(1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2613 (2006)).
303. 15 U.S.C. § 2613(c) (2006).
304. Id. at § 2613(c)(2)(B)(i).
305. Id.
306. Indus. Safety Equip. Ass’n v. EPA, 837 F.2d 1115, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
307. Id. at 1117–21.
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Ultimately, agencies like the EPA and FDA share much in
common, and could benefit from adopting similar policies and
procedures that preserve their discretion to make announcements in
the interest of public health and safety. Congress should also
consider whether public health agencies like the EPA and FDA have
sufficiently clear statutory authority to make necessary public
statements, as both agencies present compelling cases to retain wide
discretion to do so.
3. Consumer Product Safety Commission
The CPSC is one of the only federal agencies to be guided by
clear congressional directives governing its announcements. In 1982,
Congress amended the Consumer Product Safety Act to require that
the agency publish only information that is accurate and balanced.308
The law followed several embarrassing incidents in which the CPSC
identified allegedly unsafe products but released inaccurate
information, costing the manufacturers significant amounts of
money.309 Congress was concerned that the CPSC would unfairly
publicize inaccurate information that might harm a company.310
The amendments required the CPSC to: (1) assure that its public
statements are accurate and fair; (2) give manufacturers advance
notice and an opportunity to respond, subject to some exemptions,
including emergencies; (3) respond to the manufacturer’s objections
or face an injunction; and (4) retract errors in roughly the same
manner that the agency made the original disclosure.311
The law has made the CPSC more “cautious about naming
individual products without careful internal review of the technical
support documentation.”312 Still, the CPSC has been sued over
public statements that do not mention a particular manufacturer.313

308. 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b); O’Reilly, The 411 on 515, supra note 7, at 847.
309. O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 7, at 542; Noah, supra note 7,
at 890. The CPSC is authorized to declare products to be “substantial product hazards” after
adjudicatory hearings. 15 U.S.C. § 2064.
310. H.R. REP. NO. 1153, at 32 (1972); 118 CONG. REC. H31,389 (daily ed. Sept. 20,
1972) (statement of Rep. Crane).
311. 15 U.S.C. § 2055(b). The CPSC promulgated regulations at 16 C.F.R. part 1101
fleshing out these details.
312. O’Reilly, The 411 on 515, supra note 7, at 848.
313. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. CPSC, 414 F. Supp. 1047, 1057–58 (D. Del.
1976).
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In fact, like the FDA and the FTC, the CPSC is one of the most
frequently sued agencies for making public announcements.
In one case, a court found that the CPSC had exceeded its
statutory authority to notify the public of product risks because its
press release announcing that toy dolls were “banned hazardous
substances” was not a final determination and thus was not
authorized to be disclosed under the statute.314 However, the court
refused to order the CPSC to retract its statement because it was
technically accurate, and because a retraction would only further
confuse the public, as the allegations still had not been addressed by
the court.315 This case shows why courts are often reluctant to
intervene.
In another case, an aluminum manufacturer sued the CPSC for
violating the Act’s procedural protections for manufacturers, even
though the CPSC’s public statements made only general statements
about problems with aluminum wiring and did not mention the
manufacturer or its products by name.316 The court held that Kaiser
should be able to ask for a retraction, per the Act, but that Congress
did not intend for manufacturers whose identities could not readily
be ascertained to receive prior notice and an opportunity to
comment.317 Like the FTC in Trudeau, the CPSC was sued despite
taking precautions.
These cases illustrate that parties regulated by the CPSC, as with
parties regulated by the FDA and the EPA, are particularly sensitive
to negative announcements. Although the agency continues to be
sued for its practices, the Consumer Product Safety Act remains a
model that Congress could apply to other agencies.
4. Securities and Exchange Commission
The SEC seems to appreciate more than other agencies the
effects of adverse publicity,318 perhaps because its regulatory scheme
tries to ensure that investors have access to both positive and
negative information about public companies.

314. United States v. 52,823 Children’s Dolls, More or Less, No. 89 Civ. 4643 (JFK),
1989 WL 140250, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 1989).
315. Id. at *7–8.
316. Kaiser Aluminum, 414 F. Supp. at 1057–58.
317. Id.
318. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1394 n.48.
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SEC complaints receive a lot of publicity, often generated by the
agency itself, and courts have held that such publicity is part of the
“expense and annoyance of litigation.”319 Injunctions rarely succeed
unless the plaintiffs can show that the SEC is engaged in an
aggressive and ongoing publicity campaign against the party.320 SEC
regulations allow the subjects of preliminary investigations to, “on
their own initiative, submit a written statement to the Commission”
making their case.321 But this regulation does not confer procedural
rights to litigants, and the SEC can file a formal complaint without
violating the subject’s due process or statutory rights.322
The SEC also has a policy that directs agency personnel to give
advance notice to defendants of enforcement actions so they do not
learn of complaints through the news.323 But an internal
investigation found that SEC personnel do not always follow the
policy, and that some are not even aware of it.324
In 2010, some Congressmen criticized the SEC for publicizing
charges against Goldman Sachs and allegedly trying to embarrass the
company.325 The SEC filed its complaint without first notifying
Goldman Sachs, in violation of agency policy.326 The agency also
publicized the complaint via Twitter, just one week after establishing
its SEC_News Twitter feed.327
319. First Jersey Sec., Inc. v. SEC, 553 F. Supp. 205, 212 (D.N.J. 1982) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 244
(1980)).
320. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc. v. SEC, No. C-81-546, 1982 WL 1566, at *4 (E.D. Wash.
Jan. 20, 1982) (distinguishing its case from Silver King Mines v. Cohen, 261 F. Supp. 666 (D.
Utah 1966), in which the SEC was engaged in “an aggressively adverse publicity campaign
against Silver King,” which was “so arbitrary and capricious as to amount to a due process
violation”).
321. 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(c) (2008).
322. Wellman v. Dickinson, 79 F.R.D. 341, 352–53 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). This case did not
involve adverse publicity by the SEC, but instead involved general allegations that the SEC was
abusive during its investigation, including a specific allegation that the agency disclosed
privileged documents to private litigants.
323. SEC OIG, supra note 25, at 57–59 (citing Administrative Regulation SECR 18-2 §
B(15)(c)).
324. Id.
325. SEC, LITIGATION RELEASE NO. 21489, THE SEC CHARGES GOLDMAN SACHS
WITH FRAUD IN CONNECTION WITH THE STRUCTURING AND MARKETING OF A SYNTHETIC
CDO (Apr. 16, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/
lr21489.htm.
326. SEC OIG, supra note 25 (citing Administrative Regulation SECR 18-2, §
B(15)(c)).
327. SEC_News, TWITTER (Apr. 16, 2010), https://twitter.com/#!/SEC_News/status/
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The SEC’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) subsequently
investigated how the agency publicized the complaint, including
allegations that SEC employees had leaked details to the New York
Times prior to filing charges.328 Although the review found no
evidence of such a leak, it did note that at least one news reporter
knew that the SEC had scheduled a decision on the Commission’s
nonpublic calendar a day before the complaint was filed.329
The OIG’s report provides a remarkable inside view of the
Commission’s internal deliberations when choosing to publicize a
complaint.330 The document reveals that although the SEC was
acutely aware of how to maximize publicity for its complaint against
Goldman Sachs, it was relatively oblivious to the massive market
reaction that it might trigger. For example, SEC personnel were well
aware that announcing two cases on the same day would dilute the
publicity for both, and that announcing on a Friday typically reduces
media coverage.331 But employees were “shocked” and “quite
surprised” about the resulting media coverage and market
reaction.332 Goldman Sachs’s stock price fell 13%, “the biggest oneday decline in its stock in over a year.”333
The report also confirmed that agency publicity can be driven by
many motives: the SEC wanted to show taxpayers that it was
enforcing the law; it wanted to deter other violations; it wanted to
control the message by beating a media-savvy company like
Goldman Sachs to the punch; and it wanted to ensure accuracy.334
No e-mails, internal documents, or sworn testimony showed that the
SEC intended to punish Goldman Sachs. But there was significant
internal discussion about using announcements strategically during
investigations and how advanced notice of such announcements

12303044878. The earliest tweets for this feed were published on April 9, 2010.
328. SEC OIG, supra note 25, at 12.
329. Id. at 31–32.
330. Id. at 1–2. To wit, the Inspector General reviewed over 3.4 million e-mails from
sixty-four SEC employees during the time. It also took sworn testimony from thirty-two
witnesses and reviewed documents from the agency, the New York Times, and Bloomberg
Media.
331. Id. at 49, 51, 55.
332. Id. at 65–66.
333. Id. at 65.
334. Id. at 49, 55, 61–62.
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might encourage gamesmanship by regulated firms and discourage
efforts to settle cases.335
In the end, the OIG found that SEC personnel did not follow
and were not aware of the Commission’s publicity policies.336 The
report recommended that the SEC consider revising the policy and
give better guidance to staff on how to apply it.337
5. Other agencies
The experiences of other agencies are hard to generalize, given
the diversity of agencies and agency practices. But even a superficial
glimpse confirms some of the observations above.
Although a few agencies have adopted rules or standards, none
approach the recommendations by Gellhorn and ACUS. For
example, the predecessor to the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) issued regulations governing its use of
publicity in 1976, though it narrowly defined the scope of publicity
that it covered.338 The Department of Justice has published rules on
issuing publicity, which are largely tailored to ensure that officials do
not make public statements that might influence the outcome of
pending or future trials.339 In 1975, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) adopted policies for announcing
regulatory actions.340 This policy, which is not available on its web
site but is referenced in cases,341 states that the ATF will issue press
releases describing significant regulatory actions.342 Overall, some
agency policies do address adverse publicity, though not in anything
approaching the comprehensive manner recommended by ACUS.
Congress has also authorized some agencies to issue publicity,
even if it is clearly adverse. The U.S. Department of Agriculture

335. Id. at 57–64.
336. Id. at 65.
337. Id. at 77.
338. Release of Adverse Information to News Media, 41 Fed. Reg. 2–3 (Jan. 2, 1976)
(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 17).
339. 28 C.F.R. § 50.2 (2010).
340. ATF, INDUSTRY CIRCULAR 1975-21: PUBLICATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS
TAKEN BY ATF (Dec. 11, 1975), available at http://ttb.gov/industry_circulars/archives/
1975/75-21.html.
341. Banfi Prods. Corp. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 107, 118 (Fed. Cl. 1997),
modified, 41 Fed Cl. 581 (Fed. Cl. 1998).
342. See id. at 118 (citing ATF, supra note 340).
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(USDA) is authorized by statute to disseminate information343 and
has been sued for doing so.344 The National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) is authorized to notify the public of safety
defects with automobiles.345 The NHTSA must alert registered
vehicle owners of defects, even if the manufacturer objects.346 But
Gellhorn found that, like most agencies, the NHTSA had “not
subjected its publicity program to rigorous examination” and had no
rules or policies governing its practices.347 Years later, the NHTSA
still clings to the notion that corrective publicity can undo any
errors,348 despite Gellhorn’s caution that the public does not digest
corrective press releases quite the same way.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recognizes that
adverse publicity can encourage companies to comply with its
regulations.349 Yet, it has taken conflicting approaches on whether to
mitigate civil penalties based on adverse publicity from the
enforcement action itself.350 Similarly, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) acknowledges that publicizing investigations
that have not resulted in a formal complaint can be unfair,351 but
continues to do so anyway.352
343. 7 U.S.C. § 430 (2006).
344. Impro Prods., Inc. v. Block, 722 F.2d 845, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
345. 49 U.S.C. §§ 30118–19; Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1416 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1402
(repealed 1994)).
346. Determination of Manufacturer’s Obligation, 49 C.F.R. § 557.8 (2010).
347. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1419.
348. For example, the NHSTA stated that suppliers whose components are erroneously
identified as defective in recall notices can simply counter “[a]ny adverse publicity that does
erroneously affect a supplier . . . by publicizing the correct information when it becomes
available.” Petitions for Rulemaking, Defect and Noncompliance Orders, 60 Fed. Reg. 17,254,
17,257 (Apr. 5, 1995).
349. See, e.g., Nuclear Regulatory Commission Revisions to Procedures to Issue Orders,
56 Fed. Reg. 40,664, 40,683 (Aug. 15, 1991).
350. See Nuclear Regulatory Commission Order Imposing Civil Monetary Penalty on
Reich Geo-Physical, Inc., 49 Fed. Reg. 44,253, 44,255 (Nov. 5, 1984) (“NRC’s Enforcement
Policy states that enforcement actions are publicly available and that press releases are generally
issued for civil penalties and Orders. Mitigation of civil penalties because of adverse publicity
suffered by a licensee is not considered in the Enforcement Policy to be a basis for mitigating
civil penalties.”). But see Nuclear Regulatory Commission Order Imposing Civil Monetary
Penalties on Inspection and Testing, Inc., 49 Fed. Reg. 28,781, 28,783 (July 16, 1984)
(mitigating civil monetary penalties based in part on the loss caused by adverse publicity from
the enforcement action and the NRC’s attendant press release).
351. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Rules Relating to Investigations, 50 Fed.
Reg. 47,556, 47,557 (Nov. 19, 1985).
352. See, e.g., News Release, FERC, FERC Launches Investigation into Pipeline Rates
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These and other agencies deserve more scrutiny, not only
because they offer variations on the FDA’s story, but because they
also appear to be using adverse publicity in ways that invoke longstanding concerns.
V. RENEWING THE CALL FOR STANDARDS
Given these findings, I propose several ways that courts,
Congress, and agencies themselves can impose standards on adverse
agency publicity. I revisit the recommendations by Gellhorn and
ACUS based on the trends since 1973 described in Part III,
agencies’ responses, and the case law canvassed in Part IV.
A. Should Publicity Be Used To Punish?
A threshold question is whether agencies should be able to use
adverse publicity to punish, deter, or otherwise sanction regulated
parties. Doing so can result in burdens that are more severe than
those authorized by statute, and regulated parties often cannot
challenge these actions in court.353 Indeed, as Lars Noah argues, such
arm-twisting “may be even more insidious than the frequently
discussed tendency of agencies to develop informal but essentially
binding policies without adhering to notice and comment
rulemaking procedures.”354 Moreover, because the problem often
evades judicial review, some scholars have called for agencies to
exercise greater self-restraint.355
Others recognize the power of publicity in another way, by
calling for Congress and courts to employ it as a form of punitive
damages on corporate wrongdoers.356 The U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines authorize publicity in some circumstances.357 Gellhorn
acknowledged that an agency deciding to issue adverse publicity is

(Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2010/2010-4/11-18-10-G3.asp (announcing investigations into the rates charged by two gas companies, Kinder Morgan
Interstate Gas Transmission and Ozark Gas Transmission).
353. See Noah, supra note 7, at 875.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 876; Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1421.
356. See generally FISSE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 20; Curcio, supra note 161; Cowan,
supra note 20. These recommendations often reference Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The Scarlet
Letter (1850) and colonial forms of punishment.
357. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 8B1.4 (applying § 5F1.4), 8D1.4(a)
(2010); Cowan, supra note 20, at 2387.
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somewhat analogous to a prosecutor exercising prosecutorial
discretion.358 In fact, because regulatory violations can sometimes
trigger criminal prosecutions, agencies and the Justice Department
have been sued for issuing pretrial publicity.359 Still others point out
that adverse publicity does not always deter wrongdoing.360
Nevertheless, adverse publicity can be a blunt instrument that
injures companies in ways that courts or agencies cannot calibrate.
Agencies should not be able to punish alleged regulatory violators
with indeterminate sanctions without providing some sort of
procedural relief.361 The Eighth Amendment prohibits “excessive
fines,”362 and adverse publicity can generate “fines” or punishments
that are “determined later by the capricious jury of public
opinion.”363 Thus, neither agencies nor legislatures can define the
upper or lower limits of such punishment.364 Agencies should be
limited to issuing factual publicity that fulfills a legitimate statutory
purpose, such as warning the public of health hazards or
considerable financial risks. If this unduly restricts agencies’ capacity
to regulate effectively, then Congress should enhance their statutory
enforcement authority and provide enough resources to use these
statutory powers.

358. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1381 n.4.
359. In United States v. Abbott Laboratories, Justice Department prosecutors and FDA
officials issued press releases and made statements to the media after a grand jury indictment
charged Abbott and five employees with distributing pharmaceuticals that were potentially
deadly. 505 F.2d 565, 568–69 (4th Cir. 1974). Although both the district court and the
Fourth Circuit strongly condemned FDA and Justice Department lawyers for jeopardizing the
right to a fair trial, the Fourth Circuit reversed a decision by the district court dismissing the
charges because there were other ways to protect the defendants’ right to a fair trial short of
dismissal. Id. at 571–72. The court explained,
[W]e join in the district court’s condemnation of this conduct and express our
strongest disapproval that highly placed legal officers would make a statement of this
import with regard to a pending criminal prosecution, and even more so that FDA,
which had referred the matter to the Department of Justice, would issue a press
release containing such prejudicial material.
Id. at 571.
360. For example, Lochner and Cain express doubts that adverse publicity deters
offenders of campaign finance laws. Todd Lochner & Bruce E. Cain, Equity and Efficacy in the
Enforcement of Campaign Finance Laws, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1891, 1919–20 (1999).
361. Even Professor Curcio, who proposes using adverse publicity as a formal sanction,
acknowledges that it is indeterminate. Curcio, supra note 161, at 377–78.
362. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
363. FISSE & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 20, at 310.
364. Id.
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B. Agencies Should Articulate Standards

When Gellhorn published his article in 1973, very few agencies
provided written guidance on issuing press releases.365 Today, not
much has changed. Most agencies have an Office of Public Affairs or
an equivalent, though few provide written guidelines on making
media announcements.366 Very few of the cases I surveyed alleged
that the agency violated its own internal procedures,367 in part
because very few agencies have such procedures (or at least publish
them). Moreover, very few agencies are governed by statutes that
specifically require confidentiality and constrain their public
statements—and even when they are, courts have struggled to find
suitable remedies.368 Thus, the overarching purpose of the following
recommendations is not to completely remove agency discretion to
issue adverse publicity but to domesticate it with substantive and
procedural safeguards.369
1. Content guidelines
Agencies should adopt policies governing the content of
publicity, including guidelines for condensed announcements in new
media formats like Twitter. Even though agencies may be checked
by internal protocols, as well as by “custom, habit, and natural
bureaucratic caution,”370 the stakes are too high to rely on these
alone. Agencies with written policies tend to abuse publicity less than
agencies without them.371 Publishing policies not only would notify
365. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1384 (citing the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare’s Department Staff Manual), 1388 (citing the FTC’s Public Information Policy
Guidebook), 1396–97 (citing various SEC memoranda).
366. O’Reilly, The 411 on 515, supra note 7, at 838 n.13 (citing only the HHS policy and
a since-retracted proposed policy from the FDA in 1976).
367. See, e.g., FTC v. Magui Publishers, Inc., No. CV 89-3818-RSWL, 1990 WL
132719 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 1990) (alleging that the FTC violated FTC Operating Manual
Ch. 17 § 2.5 but holding that the alleged violation was not severe enough to modify or vacate
a preliminary injunction).
368. For example, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b) and 2000e-8(e) prohibit employees of the
Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (EEOC) from making charges public during
investigations and early adjudicatory proceedings. In EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., the court
refused to dismiss the EEOC’s claims of unfair employment practices against Sears even
though the EEOC had leaked its complaint to the public. 504 F. Supp. 241, 269–70 (N.D. Ill.
1980).
369. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1429.
370. Id. at 1419.
371. Id. at 1423 n.174 (comparing the FTC’s record to the EEOC’s).
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regulated parties of agency standards, but would encourage agency
personnel to exercise their discretion wisely, serving a prophylactic
purpose.372
First, agency policies should instruct personnel to avoid using
excessively disparaging terminology. For example, “FTC officials
scrupulously avoid comments likely to prejudice the respondent’s
case.”373 The FDA once announced that it would avoid using
“disparaging terminology” that is “not essential to the purpose of
the publicity.”374 The FDA also explained that it could not avoid
using disparaging terminology in all cases, particularly when warning
the public about a particular company or product.375 And in at least
one recent case, a court declined to enjoin the FTC despite an
announcement that described the alleged violator as a “habitual false
advertiser.”376 The court noted that the press release correctly
attributed the comment to a single FTC employee rather than any
adjudicator or fact finder,377 noting that “[a] cause of action does not
exist under the APA every time a government official characterizes
someone an agency is investigating.”378 Courts have also upheld
FDA publicity when the FDA allegedly called health food and
dietary supplement manufacturers “quacks” and “faddists,” even
though FDA disputed using those words.379 Thus, it is important
that agency policies instruct personnel not to use such language,
because courts virtually never provide a remedy for its use.
Agency policies should also require that agencies clarify the
nature of the action as best as possible. This is particularly important
for new media, like Twitter, that make incredibly truncated
announcements. Companies are rightly concerned that agency
publicity can misstate the nature of the agency’s action or mislead
372. Noah, supra note 7, at 940.
373. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1390.
374. FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,436, 12,440 (Mar.
4, 1977) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 2).
375. Id. at 12,437.
376. Trudeau v. FTC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 281, 292 (D.D.C. 2005).
377. Id.; Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
378. Trudeau, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 292 n.12. Similarly, in another case, a court refused to
grant a protective order against the FTC when its lead counsel sent a letter to local media
inviting them to read the FTC’s complaint and stating that the company’s advertisements were
“simply false.” FTC v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 1066, 1068–1069 (D. Utah
1997).
379. Ajay Nutrition Foods, Inc. v. FDA, 378 F. Supp. 210, 212, 218 (D.N.J. 1974),
aff’d mem., 513 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1975).
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the public to believe that the allegations are more definitive than
they really are.380 Agencies should adopt a policy similar to that of
the FTC. When the FTC announces that it has brought a formal
complaint, agency officials generally try to clarify that the case has
not yet been adjudicated and explain the procedural posture.381
But it is not clear whether such disclaimers are effective.
Regulated companies believe that FTC press releases fail to
adequately emphasize “the tentative nature of the charges filed,”
which further invites the media and the public to interpret a
complaint as a final determination of wrongdoing.382 The public
tends to believe that “where there’s smoke, there’s fire.”383 New
media make it even more difficult to communicate legal and
regulatory nuance. But agency policies should encourage
announcements to inform without overstating.
Since 1973, courts have upheld the use of press release titles that
imply a finding of wrongdoing when the subtitle and body clarify
otherwise.384 But agencies should be careful not to make such
implications because the media can easily misconstrue them. Thus, a
press release title stating that a regulated party has been “banned”
from certain conduct could more accurately state that the parties
“agreed” to such a ban.385 Agencies certainly are not “obliged to
repeat every word or phrase in a settlement” in press releases.386 But
they also should avoid using language in titles and headings that are
likely to be misinterpreted, particularly in new media blurbs.387
380. See, e.g., Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. CPSC, 414 F. Supp. 1047, 1061–62
(D. Del. 1976) (alleging that the CPSC’s public statements misled the public to believe that
the CPSC had made a final determination based on more solid evidence than it really had).
381. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1390–91 n.35 (noting that after the Cinderella Schools
case the FTC included the following disclaimer in a black box on press releases announcing or
implying that a firm has violated the law: “NOTE: The FTC issues a complaint when it has
‘reason to believe’ that the law has been violated. Such action does not imply adjudication of
the matters alleged.”).
382. Id. at 1391.
383. Id.
384. Trudeau v. FTC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 281, 292 (D.D.C. 2005), aff’d, 456 F.3d 178
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (acknowledging that “[b]y its nature, a title will not always capture the full
detail of the document it is describing,” and noting that the press release in that case
“accurately complete[d] the picture not only once but twice”).
385. See, e.g., id. (noting that the FTC clarified the potentially misleading title twice in
the subtitle and body of the press release).
386. Id. at 292.
387. Id. at 285–86. Note that although several media outlets correctly interpreted the
nature of the FTC’s announcement in Trudeau, some did not.

1431

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

11/10/2011 4:50 PM

2011

Courts are correct that press releases can always be written to be
more objective and accurate, and that agencies “cannot be blamed
because certain media reports inaccurately reported an accurate press
release.”388 But agencies should strive for press releases that will not,
in fact, be misinterpreted. And they should recognize that new
media are extremely condensed, and that even noncondensed forms
can contain inaccuracies.389
Agencies should also consider not only the accuracy of particular
statements, but the impressions left by the announcement as a
whole. In one case, the CPSC announced in a press release that
although its investigation was inconclusive and there was no risk of
serious harm to consumers, it remained concerned about the
manufacturer’s products and simply did not have the budget to
substantiate its concerns.390 The press release then included a list of
precautions for consumers using that entire class of products, even
though the focus of the investigation discussed in the press release
was clearly limited to one manufacturer’s products.391 Agencies
should avoid this type of subterfuge.
Although media outlets have been sued for libel for
misinterpreting agency press releases, these claims can be very
difficult to sustain against media organizations with reporting
privileges,
absent
evidence
of
malice
or
intentional
392
misrepresentation. Agencies, of course, maintain the discretion to
issue publicity, “even if there is the possibility that the information
may be ignored, misinterpreted, oversimplified, overstated, or
misunderstood by the media or by the public.”393
Agencies should maintain discretion, but should not be oblivious
to these concerns. Agency policies should aim for publicity that will

388. Id. at 293.
389. For example, in Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814,
817 (N.D. Cal. 1977), a debt collection company that was the subject of an FTC press release
announcing charges against that company and several others sued several newspapers and wire
services for libel for inaccurately stating that the FTC made certain charges against that
company.
390. Reliance Elec. v. CPSC, 924 F.2d 274, 275–76 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
391. Id. at 281–82.
392. Trans World Accounts, 425 F. Supp. at 821–22 (finding no evidence that wire
services incorrectly reporting an FTC press release did so intentionally or with malice, but
allowing discovery of newspaper company’s knowledge and motives).
393. FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,436, 12,437 (Mar.
4, 1977) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 2).
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not in fact be misprocessed. To aid in this effort, press releases
posted on agency websites and via new media, like Twitter, should
include prominent links to any underlying documents, including
complaints and orders, so that those reading the press release can
appreciate that it summarizes facts and proceedings that may be far
more complicated.394
2. Procedures for issuing adverse publicity
Given all the ways agencies can issue publicity today, it is
probably more important than ever that agencies articulate
procedures for doing so. The recommendations by Gellhorn and
ACUS are still worth pursuing. Agencies should establish standards
for determining whether to issue publicity,395 whether it is
necessary,396 whether there are alternatives that are equally
effective,397 whether the supporting information is reliable,398 and the
likelihood of causing severe harm to the subject.399 Policies should
also make clear who within the agency may issue publicity and
should direct media inquiries away from agency investigators and
litigators.400 Finally, the core recommendations—that agencies
should notify private parties in advance, give those parties an
opportunity to comment, and set up procedures to retract incorrect
statements401—would go a long way towards ameliorating the
problems that have persisted since 1973. Once a commitment to

394. Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 182 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (noting that the FTC’s press
release announcing a settlement included prominent links to “Related Documents,” including
the Final Order that was the subject of the press release).
395. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1424.
396. Id. at 1425–26; Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United
States, 38 Fed. Reg. 16,839, 16,839 (June 27, 1973) (to be codified at 1 C.F.R. pt. 305). For
example, Gellhorn recommended that the FTC “limit the use of publicity to cases in which it
was necessary to warn the public about imminent danger,” among other circumstances.
Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1427.
397. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1426. ACUS urged agencies to use adverse publicity
“only to the extent necessary to foster agency efficiency, public understanding, or the accuracy
of news coverage.” Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States,
38 Fed. Reg. at 16,839.
398. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1426; Recommendations of the Administrative
Conference of the United States, 38 Fed. Reg. at 16,839.
399. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1427–28.
400. Id. at 1430.
401. Id. at 1431; Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United
States, 38 Fed. Reg. at 16,839.
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these policies is in place, agencies can receive latitude to tailor these
policies to fit their unique situations.
Of course, some of these recommendations leave open questions.
a. The least burdensome alternative? This Article argues that
agencies should be held to an abuse of discretion standard, and when
applying this standard, courts should consider whether an agency
could have used less harmful options than issuing adverse publicity,
keeping in mind that some industries are more sensitive to adverse
publicity than others.402
But Gellhorn’s recommendation that adverse publicity be a
response of last rather than first resort has generated some debate.
ACUS recommended that agencies not issue publicity when the
targets could avoid harming the public by ceasing the offending
practice.403 The FDA responded to these recommendations by
arguing that this resolution will rarely work for the firms it regulates
because their products may already be in commerce “or in people’s
homes.”404 Again, agencies should be able to customize their
standards.
b. The timing of publicity? The timing of publicity remains a hotly
disputed topic. Publicizing the results of an official adjudication
rarely generates objections; but publicizing that the agency has
merely begun an investigation or filed a formal complaint can
unfairly damage the parties named. Regulated parties obviously
prefer that an agency notify them in private before publicizing
contemplated action.405 But at least one court has called adverse
publicity part of “the expense and annoyance of litigation.”406
This is nothing new of course. As early as 1918, the FTC
adopted a policy of issuing press releases whenever it filed
complaints.407 In 1968, the D.C. Circuit upheld this practice.408 The
402. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1410, 1416–18 (noting that the public tends to be much
more sensitive to food safety hazards than automobile hazards).
403. Recommendations of the Administrative Conference of the United States, 38 Fed.
Reg. at 16,839.
404. FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,436, 12,439 (Mar.
4, 1977) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 2).
405. See Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1394.
406. First Jersey Sec., Inc. v. SEC, 553 F. Supp. 205, 212 (D.N.J. 1982) (quoting FTC
v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 244 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
407. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1388–89.
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court seemed to use a “probable cause” standard, explaining that the
FTC may “alert the public to suspected violations of the law by
factual press releases whenever the Commission shall have reason to
believe that a respondent is engaged in activities made unlawful by
the Act.”409 Decades later, the FTC still publicizes its allegations.410
For example, the court in FTC v. Freecom Communications denied a
protective order against the FTC after the agency’s lead counsel sent
a letter to local media describing the FTC’s complaint, in part
because the court found that it was obvious that the letter stated the
counsel’s opinion rather than any “particularized fact.”411 Another
court even defended the FTC’s use of such publicity, recognizing
that the agency publicizes complaints in part “to induce respondents
to agree promptly to remedial orders without the necessity of
extended legal proceedings.”412 Congress should resolve whether
these practices should be allowed given each agency’s statutory
authority and funding constraints.
Similarly, Congress rarely limits agency discretion to publicize
preliminary actions. My research found only two federal statutes that
specifically prohibit an agency from publicizing investigations. One
statute prohibits the Federal Election Commission (FEC) from
publicizing investigations into suspected violations of campaign
finance laws due to concerns that it would be premature and
unfair.413 Another statute prohibits the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) from “making public”
information that it obtains while investigating or negotiating with
employers suspected of violating employment discrimination laws.414

408. See FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Sch., Inc., 404 F.2d 1308, 1313–14
(D.C. Cir. 1968) (citing sections 5 and 6(f) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 45(a)–(b), 46(f) (1964)).
409. Id. at 1314 (emphasis added).
410. See, e.g., FTC v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 1066 (D. Utah 1997).
411. Id. at 1068–69. Counsel’s letter to the media stated: “I invite you to take a look at
the evidence in the files of the District Court. That evidence shows that the defendants have
misrepresented [how successful their customers have been] . . . . The defendants continue to
use success stories and testimonials that are simply false.” Id. at 1068.
412. Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814, 820 (N.D. Cal.
1977).
413. Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(4)(B), (a)(12)(A) (2006);
Common Cause v. FEC, 83 F.R.D. 410, 412 (D.D.C. 1979).
414. Civil Rights Act §§ 706(b), 709(e), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), 2000e-8(e); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. EEOC, 581 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that these sections
prohibited the EEOC from disclosing information not only to the public in general, but also
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Outside these two narrow contexts, most agencies “regularly
publicize every significant formal action,” even when doing so is not
necessary to warn the public.415 As noted above, my survey of FDA
press announcements between 2004 and 2010 found that 30% of
these announcements disclosed pending or preliminary actions that
had not been fully adjudicated.416
Sometimes preliminary announcements can be justified on
pragmatic grounds; for example, when agency complaints are already
public. And agencies do not always have the luxury of waiting for
cases to conclude, such as when announcing product recalls or other
public health hazards.417 But agencies should develop standards for
publicizing pending and preliminary actions, and Congress should
authorize them when necessary.
Agencies often find themselves in a no-win situation, as when
they are criticized for not announcing information early enough.
Gellhorn observed that NHTSA notifications of vehicle defects
tended to be less damaging because they “often occur months after
the defect is first suspected, and they are usually preceded by lengthy
and thorough testing in which the manufacturer has a chance to
participate.”418 But the NHTSA has also been criticized for not
alerting the public earlier to suspected safety defects, such as the
recent safety problems surrounding Toyota vehicles.419
To avoid defaulting to either extreme—disclosing too early or
too late—agencies should articulate standards for when to release
publicity, so that their decisions are at least consistent. Moreover, to
the extent feasible, agencies should notify the subjects of publicity
and solicit their input before the statement issues. When agencies
provide basic notice and an opportunity to comment, even
informally, these gestures tend to defuse concerns.420

to parties outside the government that brought Title VII employment discrimination charges).
415. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1392.
416. See supra Part IV.A (finding that 463 out of 1,542 press releases announced
tentative actions rather than final, determinative actions).
417. Note that a significant portion of FDA press releases announcing pending or
preliminary actions also announced product recalls or made other announcements that
ostensibly could be justified on public health grounds.
418. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1418.
419. See, e.g., 156 CONG. REC. S2759–60 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 2010) (statement of Sen.
Barbara Boxer).
420. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1418.
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Of course, regulated parties might abuse any procedural
protections or appeals mechanisms that agencies make available,
particularly to delay announcements.421 Again, agencies should retain
some discretion to publish announcements before responding to
private parties—for example, by justifying publicity when the agency
perceives that there is an imminent public health emergency—and
courts can review agency decisions for an abuse of discretion ex post.
Courts should also consider whether private parties abused these
procedures.
c. Postpublication procedures? Agencies should adopt procedures
for retracting and correcting any inaccurate or misleading statements
with at least the same force and vigor as the initial statement.
Though such retractions are infamous for going unnoticed,422
agencies should strive for symmetry between negative and positive
disclosures, much as some agencies like the FDA and SEC require
from regulated parties. Currently, agencies publicize when they file
complaints or bring successful enforcement actions, but rarely
announce that investigations found no wrongdoing, that complaints
failed, or that enforcement actions otherwise did not succeed. And
when agencies do make positive announcements, they typically do
not publicize them with the same vigor, nor does the media give
them the same amount of attention.423 One exception is the FTC’s
practice of publishing a “closing letter” if an investigation into
possible regulatory violations finds no wrongdoing.424 Other agencies
should consider this type of device.
Agencies should also instruct parties how to request corrections
or retractions, even if this entails filing a citizens’ petition or
something similar.425 O’Reilly notes that removing disputed
information is often the preferred remedy, followed closely by
421. O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 7, at 546–47.
422. O’Reilly, The 411 on 515, supra note 7, at 849.
423. Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1391–92 (noting that the FTC failed to adequately
correct or publicize its erroneous adverse publicity, announcing that DuPont deceptively
marketed its antifreeze, Zerex, despite the FTC’s later finding that the more serious charges it
had alleged were unfounded).
424. FTC, COMMISSION CLOSING LETTERS, http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/
commclosing.shtm (last visited Aug. 19, 2011).
425. See, e.g., FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,436,
12,440 (Mar. 4, 1977) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 2) (notifying parties that they may
request corrections or retractions to FDA publicity through the citizens petition procedures,
now available at 21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (2010)).
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retraction and correction.426 Agencies are more than capable of
maintaining distribution lists and reaching the same audience
twice.427
Agencies should also allow companies to file expedited requests.
For example, the FDA’s 1977 proposed publicity policy instructed
parties to send expedited requests in writing to the Assistant
Commissioner for Public Affairs.428 O’Reilly suggests that agencies
should have a limited time to review disputed information on
websites, and his recommendation applies equally to adverse
publicity.429 Agencies should establish internal deadlines for resolving
the dispute and publish such deadlines. Once agencies adopt these
basic principles, they can meet their diverse needs by tailoring the
guidelines to meet their reasonable policy goals.
Agencies might also use an ombudsman or a Chief Information
Officer to review disputes about agency publicity.430 Some federal
agencies use an ombudsman’s office to mediate disputes between
private parties and the agency, and some are even required to do so
by statute.431 By taking these steps, agencies could generate more
credibility with industries and the media, and perhaps deter
litigation.432
d. Distinguishing active versus passive publicity? Another debate
that seems to be more pressing today than in 1973 is whether a
distinction should be made between actively and passively releasing
information. Although agencies today can passively release
information, this information may be quickly picked up by the trade

426. O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 7, at 534–36 (arguing that
agencies should flag and quickly remove inaccurate data posted on websites, much like the
EPA does with its national Envirofacts database of local environmental conditions).
427. Professor O’Reilly notes that agencies would have to retain precise recipient lists to
do so. Id. at 536. However, when the cat is out of the bag, it can be exceedingly difficult to
recapture it, particularly when multiple agencies are responsible for disseminating information.
For an almost comical effort by federal and state law enforcement agencies to retract earlier
warnings and rumors that proved to be erroneous, see Lance Industries, Inc. v. United States, 3
Cl. Ct. 762 (Cl. Ct. 1983).
428. FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. at 12,440–41.
429. O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 7, at 537.
430. Id. at 538–39.
431. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 657 (2006) (creating an ombudsman to mediate disputes
between agencies and small businesses); O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 7,
at 539.
432. O’Reilly, The 411 on 515, supra note 7, at 848.
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press, law firm client alerts, and bloggers. Agencies need not
aggressively publicize this information to have the same practical
effect. Thus, the distinction between issuing a press release and
simply releasing information, such as through a FOIA request, is less
meaningful today than it was in 1973.433
Agencies themselves may distinguish between actively
disseminating publicity that it believes “to be true and that the
public should rely on,” and merely releasing information passively
without making any express or implicit endorsements about it.434
Indeed, courts have recognized that FOIA responses by agencies do
not carry the same “government imprimatur on the document” as
affirmative statements by the agency.435 Agencies might consider
imposing more constraints on information that carries an explicit
endorsement by the agency.
Ultimately, agencies must tailor these recommendations to their
needs and statutory responsibilities. As the D.C. Circuit has stated,
the trick is “to accommodate two separate goals of fair administrative
process: protecting parties from false or unauthorized agency news
releases and promoting Congress’ clear mandate that government
information, particularly from consumer-oriented agencies, reach the
public.”436 It is essential that agencies retain discretion to alert the
public, particularly when required to do so by statute, but agencies
should not abuse this discretion.
C. Congress and Courts Should Hold Agencies Accountable
Contemporary scholarship concludes that neither federal statutes
nor courts provide remedies for private parties injured by adverse
agency publicity.437 In this section I argue that Congress should

433. Note that in 1980, the Supreme Court rejected the distinction between active versus
passive disclosures of information by the CPSC under the Consumer Product Safety Act.
CPSC v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 107–08 (1980).
434. Id. at 107. Although this may have been merely a litigating position by the CPSC to
reduce its responsibilities when responding to FOIA requests, other agencies have responded
to FOIA requests with explanations or clarifications of the nature of the information. See, e.g.,
Reliance Elec. Co. v. CPSC, 924 F.2d 274 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Pierce & Stevens Chem. Corp. v.
CPSC, 585 F.2d 1382 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that the Consumer Product Safety Act’s
disclosure procedures did not apply to disclosures pursuant to FOIA requests).
435. Pierce & Stevens, 585 F.2d at 1388.
436. Indus. Safety Equip. Ass’n v. EPA, 837 F.2d 1115, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
437. See, e.g., Noah, supra note 7, at 889–91; O’Reilly, The 411 on 515, supra note 7, at
838; O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 7, at 511–12.
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clarify which agencies can issue adverse publicity and when. In the
more likely event that Congress fails to act with such precision, I
suggest that courts (i) hold agencies to their own articulated
standards, (ii) review agency publicity under the abuse of discretion
standard, and (iii) hold that agency publicity is reviewable as final
agency action if the private party can demonstrate some tangible
harm and present evidence that the agency intended the publicity, at
least in part, to punish or sanction.
1. Statutory reform
Ideally, Congress would clarify which agencies could issue
adverse publicity, under what circumstances, and via what
procedures. Gellhorn’s suggestions are still worth pursuing.438
However, I propose what might be a simpler and more
straightforward legislative intervention: Congress should pass a
statute, perhaps as part of the APA, that clarifies that agencies have
discretion to issue publicity and notify the public (and publish
written policies to this extent), but that exercising such discretion
within an agency policy is subject to judicial review for an abuse of
discretion.
Had this standard been in place, it might have encouraged
agencies to be more careful in several of the cases above. For
example, if the FDA were subject to an abuse of discretion standard
in the SuperGen case,439 the agency might have notified SuperGen of
its objections before publicizing them, and this early notification
might have led SuperGen to correct or retract the misleading
statements about its drug. If the SEC were subject to an abuse of
discretion standard in the Goldman Sachs case,440 it might have been
more careful to notify Goldman Sachs of the complaint before filing
it, and it may have filed the complaint during nontrading hours to
avoid the market reaction. In the recent E. coli and salmonella cases,
the FDA might have been quicker and more careful at clarifying the
scope of its warnings, which may have reduced the $200 million and
$350 million fall-outs.441

438.
439.
440.
441.

1440

Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1435–39.
See discussion supra Part IV.A.
See discussion supra Part III.B.
See discussion supra Part II.B.
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In conjunction with “abuse of discretion” review, Congress
should delegate to each agency the responsibility to codify its own
procedures for issuing publicity. Perhaps as a separate reform,
Congress should enhance agencies’ statutory enforcement authority,
so that extrastatutory tactics are not clearly preferable to agencies.
On this latter point, Gellhorn noted that adverse publicity used
to sanction can forestall both agencies and Congress from
considering and testing other forms of sanctions.442 There is a certain
irony here—by using adverse publicity as an extrastatutory
enforcement tool, agencies might deter Congress from granting
more enforcement powers, or perhaps more funding to carry out
existing enforcement authority that requires more resources.
Agencies should not make the executive decision to grant themselves
more power; Congress must do it.443 Indeed, as was true nearly four
decades ago, “[t]he best solution would be for Congress to face the
choice of extending agency sanctions or of authorizing publicity as a
sanction.”444
2. Judicial review
In the more likely event that Congress does not intervene with
specific reforms, courts should review agency publicity for an abuse
of discretion. But this will require courts to resolve several open legal
questions that have persisted since 1973, including whether agency
publicity is judicially reviewable, where the cause of action resides,
and whether agency decisions are immune from challenge.
a. Is agency publicity reviewable? The threshold question is
whether courts may even review agency publicity. Courts and
scholars have long expressed concern that without judicial review,
agencies will abuse their discretion. One court worried that the
FDA’s practices might allow it to “effectively regulate industry
without ever exposing itself to judicial review.”445
Parties challenging agency publicity must surmount a number of
obstacles. The APA allows courts to review only “agency action” that
is “final.”446 Challengers must exhaust administrative remedies before
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.

Gellhorn, supra note 5, at 1421.
Id. at 1424.
Id. at 1424 n.179.
Washington Legal Found. v. Kessler, 880 F. Supp. 26, 34 (D.D.C. 1995).
5 U.S.C. §§ 551(13), 704 (2006).
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seeking judicial ones. And their complaint must be ripe for review.
Agency publicity complicates the traditional doctrinal analyses here.
Though there is a “strong presumption that Congress intends
judicial review of administrative action,”447 courts routinely decline
to review adverse agency publicity,448 finding that it is neither an
“agency action” nor “final” as the APA defines those terms.
This conclusion is problematic for several reasons. First, when an
agency publishes a press release to punish or deter a company, it
would arguably qualify under the APA’s definition of “agency
action,” which includes “the whole or part of an agency rule, order,
license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof.”449 Of
these possibilities, courts generally find that agency publicity could
qualify only as a “sanction.” The APA defines “sanction” as “an
agency . . . prohibition, requirement, limitation, or other condition
affecting the freedom of a person[, or] . . . taking other compulsory
or restrictive action.”450 The legislative history to the APA reveals
that Congress recognized that adverse publicity could be a sanction
and that this was a “troublesome subject” when the agency did not
have statutory authority.451 Although the D.C. Circuit has steadily
retreated from its assertion sixty years ago that adverse agency
publicity is never reviewable under the APA,452 it has never
encountered publicity fit to review. For example, the D.C. Circuit
has noted that “adverse impact alone would not necessarily make
agency publicity reviewable as a sanction,” explaining that an
aggrieved firm would have to show evidence that the agency
intended to penalize the company or that the publicity was false.453
The party might demonstrate intent by showing that the publicity
“caused destruction of property or revocation of a license.”454

447. Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 670 (1986).
448. O’Reilly, The 411 on 515, supra note 7, at 836 (citing Doe v. United States, 83 F.
Supp. 2d 833, 837 (S.D. Tex. 2000)).
449. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13).
450. Id. at § 551(10)(a), (g).
451. Indus. Safety Equip. Ass’n v. EPA, 837 F.2d 1115, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting
H.R. REP. NO. 79-1980, at 40 (1946) (House of Representatives Report on APA)).
452. Hearst Radio v. FCC, 167 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (refusing to review FCC’s
publication of a report titled “Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees” that
criticized one of Hearst’s stations).
453. Indus. Safety Equip., 837 F.2d at 1119.
454. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
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Otherwise, it can be exceedingly difficult to prove an agency’s intent
to sanction and thus qualify as “agency action.”
Second, if a separate statute does not specifically grant judicial
review, the APA allows courts to review only “final” agency actions
rather than tentative, intermediate, or interlocutory decisions.455
Courts have interpreted finality to mean that the agency’s decision is
the consummation of its decision making process and determines a
party’s legal rights or obligations, or otherwise has some legal
consequence for the party.456 The difficulty is that when agencies
issue publicity, it is virtually never intended to represent a binding or
final determination.457 Dating back to the 1948 opinion in Hearst
Radio v. FCC,458 the D.C. Circuit has never found an agency press
release to be “final agency action.”459 Although the D.C. Circuit has
backed away from this position, it has yet to hold otherwise.460

455. APA § 704, 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006). Some courts treat the APA’s requirement of
“final agency action” as jurisdictional, but the D.C. Circuit recently took pains to clarify that it
is not. Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 183–85 (D.C. Cir. 2006). As the court explained, “the
APA . . . is not a jurisdiction-conferring statute” and “what its judicial review provisions . . . do
provide is a limited cause of action for parties adversely affected by agency action.” Id. at 183,
185. Thus, the “final agency action” requirement speaks to a party’s cause of action rather than
a court’s jurisdiction. Courts in most circumstances would have jurisdiction to hear such cases
under the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Id. at 185; see also Ajay
Nutrition Foods, Inc. v. FDA, 378 F. Supp. 210, 215–16 (D.N.J. 1974), aff’d, 513 F.2d 625
(3d Cir. 1975) (holding that the court had jurisdiction under 21 U.S.C. § 1331 to hear action
for equitable relief against individual agency officials that issued press releases and other public
statements). In fact, on appeal to the D.C. Circuit, the FTC abandoned its earlier arguments
that APA §§ 702 and 704 bar jurisdiction to review the agency’s press releases. Trudeau, 456
F.3d at 183, 185. The D.C. Circuit thus held that APA § 702’s waiver of sovereign immunity
applied regardless of whether the press release constituted “final” agency action under § 704.
Id. at 187. For more discussion, see infra Part V.C.2.b.
456. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 478 (2001); Bennett v. Spear, 520
U.S. 154, 177–78 (1997); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967); Ciba-Geigy
Corp. v. EPA, 801 F.2d 430, 435–36 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
457. O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 7, at 512.
458. 167 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
459. Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 189. Note that in Impro Products, Inc. v. Block, 722 F.2d 845,
849 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted), the court did not hold that the
USDA’s decision to publicize adverse information was “final agency action,” but declared that
it was “disinclined to find that no agency action has taken place.”
460. Impro Prods., 722 F.2d at 849, 850 (stating that the court has “reason to question
the continued validity of the Hearst Radio decision” and that its application barring review
would be “troubling,” but nevertheless finding the claim barred by the statute of limitations
and declining to reconsider Hearst); see also Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 189.
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Courts seem to intuit that agency publicity is not categorically
unreviewable, particularly when it is false or contrary to statute.461
But I found only one judicial opinion holding that an agency’s
public statements were final, and that holding was largely motivated
by the company’s allegations of “serious, immediate and continuing
injury to its business.”462 Most courts find that a press release is not
final agency action, even when the court recognizes the harms and
the likelihood that agency hearings after the fact will not provide
relief.463
In Trudeau, as noted above, the D.C. District Court noted that
for a press release to qualify as “final,” the plaintiff would have to
produce at least one, and preferably two, types of evidence: first,
“evidence that the agency was intent on penalizing a private party
through adverse publicity”; and, second, “evidence that the press
release was demonstrably or concededly false.”464
It is not clear why the truth or falsity of the agency’s press release
is relevant to finality, given that the standard for finality is whether
the action marks the “consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking
process,” and either determines the private party’s legal rights or
obligations or has some other legal consequence.465 A truthful and
accurate press release could mark the consummation of an agency’s
decision-making process and determine a party’s legal rights or
obligations or have some other legal consequence, but a false press
release might not, particularly because an agency’s false statements
generally do not give rise to libel or defamation claims. Nevertheless,
the court in Trudeau recognized that courts must review agency
press releases “with care,” and that they reside “at the outermost
boundaries of the definitions of both ‘final’ and ‘agency action.’”466

461. Impro Prods., 722 F.2d at 849.
462. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. CPSC, 414 F. Supp. 1047, 1053–54 (D. Del.
1976).
463. Relco, Inc. v. CPSC, 391 F. Supp. 841, 846–48 (S.D. Tex. 1975). In Relco Inc. v.
CPSC, the court seemed to conflate finality with exhaustion when it said that even though the
CPSC’s press release condemning the plaintiff’s products was “final in its practical effect, the
review of the warning must initially be brought before the agency and is not final at law until it
is so brought.” Id. at 847.
464. Trudeau v. FTC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 281, 289–90 (D.D.C. 2005) (citation and
quotation omitted).
465. Id. at 289 (citing Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 482
(2004)); see also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997).
466. Trudeau, 384 F. Supp. 2d at 290.
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Agency publicity also complicates the question of finality because
publicity generally causes harm via third parties. Some courts have
declined to review agency actions that cause third parties to take
action against a product or company.467 Others have been more
sympathetic if the agency makes a statement about a product and a
party suffers direct economic injury because of it.468 However, most
courts do not allow challenges to proceed if the agency publicity is
persuasive or produces only “coercive pressures on third parties” and
does not otherwise signal final agency action.469 Agencies themselves
point out that they cannot control how parties interpret the
information they release or what they will do with it.470 Thus, the
erroneous agency press release that causes a firm’s stock to plummet
might escape review.
Third, parties must exhaust their administrative remedies before
seeking judicial review, and most agencies provide no administrative
remedies for adverse publicity. But sometimes parties can seek
judicial review before exhausting administrative remedies if the
administrative procedures and remedies cannot provide effective
relief. Thus, if an agency has procedures that allow parties to ask that
adverse publicity be corrected or retracted by the agency, courts

467. O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 7, at 513 (citing Flue-Cured
Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp. v. EPA, 313 F.3d 852, 861 (4th Cir. 2002), in which the
Fourth Circuit held that the EPA publishing a report about the health risks of secondhand
tobacco was not reviewable under the APA, even though independent third parties would react
negatively to the report, and expressing concern that “if [the court] were to adopt the position
that agency actions producing only pressures on third parties were reviewable under the APA,
then almost any agency policy or publication issued by the government would be subject to
judicial review”). See also Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Kennedy, 471 F. Supp. 1224, 1229–30 (D.
Md. 1979) (finding a report by the FDA comparing certain generic to brand name drugs
unreviewable for lack of “agency action” because the FDA intended to educate and inform the
public, despite concerns by brand name manufacturers that consumers would purchase
generics instead).
468. Tozzi v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 271 F.3d 301, 304 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (finding that a manufacturer had standing and that the agency’s decision was reviewable
by the court, but ultimately deferring to the agency’s interpretation of its own regulations);
O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 7, at 517–18.
469. Invention Submission Corp. v. Rogan, 357 F.3d 452, 458–59 (4th Cir. 2004)
(quoting the PTO’s argument); Flue-Cured Tobacco, 313 F.3d at 860–61 (holding that an
EPA report classifying secondhand smoke as a carcinogen did not constitute “final agency
action” under the APA because it produced “only coercive pressures on third parties” rather
than any “direct and appreciable legal consequences” for the plaintiffs (quoting Bennett v.
Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997))).
470. E.g., FDA Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,436, 12,439
(Mar. 4, 1977) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 2).
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would typically require parties to submit such a request before
seeking judicial review.471 Even if agencies do not, at least one court
has allowed a company to bypass administrative procedures because
it alleged that the agency’s statements “have caused and will
continue to cause severe damage” to the company’s business.472
Thus, courts may be sympathetic if the harm is immediate and
agency procedures offer no real administrative remedies.
Fourth, even if adverse publicity constitutes final agency action,
it must also be ripe for review.473 One court rejected an agency’s
motion to dismiss on this ground, finding that FDA threats in a
warning letter essentially “demand[ed] compliance” with the
agency’s position and was more definitive, final, and harmful than in
most cases because the FDA said it would take action and had
already “utilized the public press to enforce its determination.”474
The court found that the company was in a Catch-22—either
comply with the FDA’s demands or risk enforcement action.475 But
courts sometimes decline to review pre-enforcement publicity even
when recognizing that it has a significant practical effect.476

471. O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 7, at 514.
472. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. CPSC, 414 F. Supp. 1047, 1055 (D. Del.
1976). In that case, the CPSC made several public statements in a press release, an agency
news publication, and in a Federal Register notice about problems with aluminum wiring in
anticipation of initiating rulemaking to develop safety standards. Even though the statements
did not mention the manufacturer or its particular products, the court held that the
manufacturer should not have to exhaust the lengthy rulemaking process to challenge actions
that could damage its sales, goodwill, and business relationships, explaining that a wait of over
two years for the rulemaking to conclude would be “unduly harsh.” Id. at 1050–51, 1055.
473. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967)
(allowing pre-enforcement judicial review of FDA rule requiring brand name pharmaceutical
manufacturers to also list the product’s generic name in various situations because
manufacturers either had to expend significant expense changing their labeling or risk a
subsequent enforcement action by the FDA).
474. Den-Mat Corp. v. FDA, Civ. A. No. MJG-92-444, 1992 WL 208962, at *4–5 (D.
Md. Aug. 17, 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
475. Id. at *5 (noting that “Den-Mat can proceed with its current business operation and
risk serious civil and criminal penalties, or cease operations and suffer severe economic loss
while it pursues the lengthy new drug application process (which it considers unwarranted),”
but acknowledging that “[t]his dilemma may well be part of the cost of business and not an
undue burden”).
476. In Relco, Inc. v. CPSC, the court granted the CPSC’s motion to dismiss, even
though its press release warning consumers to immediately stop using Relco’s welders “carried
with it finality in its most certain and practical sense.” 391 F. Supp. 841, 846–47 (S.D. Tex.
1975). The court told Relco to utilize the “full hearing after the fact” even though “it may
offer no relief.” Id. at 847.
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Courts should relax these four requirements or interpret them
liberally when the party can make a prima facie case that the agency
has abused its discretion. This would allow courts to preview the
substantive cause of action. Particularly if there is evidence that an
agency intends for the publicity to function as a sanction, courts
should treat the statement as final agency action subject to judicial
review under the APA.477 If removing this extrastatutory sanction
unduly ties agencies’ hands, then Congress should authorize more
efficient statutory enforcement powers.
b. What cause of action? Another major unresolved question is
whether there is a suitable cause of action against agency publicity.
Each of the following might work, given certain factual predicates.
First, the APA itself might provide a cause of action. APA § 704
“suppl[ies] a generic cause of action in favor of persons aggrieved by
agency action.”478 And APA § 706 directs courts to “hold unlawful
and set aside agency action” that is “in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.”479
But plaintiffs relying on the APA for a cause of action can only sue if
the action is “final” under APA § 704.480 And of course, the D.C.
Circuit has “never found a press release . . . to constitute final agency
action under the APA.”481 Even so, the D.C. Circuit has stated that
when agency publicity does cause harm, “courts have the duty to
decide whether there is a remedy under the APA for the release of
the information.”482 Thus, although the APA seems to provide a
relatively direct path to challenge agency publicity, such challenges
have yet to succeed.

477. Lawrence A. Walke, Federal Agency Publications: The Availability of Judicial Review,
69 WASH. U. L. Q. 1267, 1275–76 (1991) (noting that agency intent should help determine
whether agency publications are reviewable). In American Trucking Association v. United
States, 755 F.2d 1292 (7th Cir. 1985), the court considered the Interstate Commerce
Commission’s intent in releasing a report on how deregulation during the 1970s and 1980s
affected the trucking industry economically. Because the Commission published the report to
educate and inform the public rather than affect the trucking industry’s legal rights, the
Seventh Circuit held that the report was not reviewable. Id. at 1297.
478. Md. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 763 F.2d 1441,
1445 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 175 (1997).
479. Administrative Procedure Act § 706(2)(C), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2006); Trudeau
v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 188 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
480. Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 188.
481. Id. at 189 (internal quotation marks omitted).
482. Indus. Safety Equip. Ass’n v. EPA, 837 F.2d 1115, 1118–19 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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Second, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) might provide a
cause of action, but scholars examining potential remedies have
concluded that the FTCA provides no relief.483 The FTCA generally
waives sovereign immunity that agencies enjoy under the 11th
Amendment, thus allowing private parties to sue the federal
government in tort under certain defined circumstances.484 But the
FTCA specifically excludes libel, slander, and other statements by
government agents that would qualify as intentional torts,485 and
courts have interpreted this as also excluding press releases.486
O’Reilly concludes that “the consistent view of courts,
commentators and career FTCA defenders is that any intentionallycaused federal agency disclosure, which causes reputational injury, is
not actionable under the FTCA.”487 There is also a major exemption
under the FTCA for discretionary functions, which courts have
interpreted as including not only the decision to issue press
releases,488 but also the underlying data upon which agencies rely.489
There are several cases dismissing FTCA causes of action for
damaging statements to the media or other forms of adverse
publicity.490
Third, plaintiffs unable to assert a cause of action against an
agency under a general or specific statute may still bring a
“nonstatutory” action if the “agency is charged with acting beyond

483. See, e.g., O’Reilly, The 411 on 515, supra note 7, at 838, 849 (citing Banfi Prods.
Corp. v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 581 (1998)); O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites,
supra note 7, at 520, 522 (analyzing whether the FTCA might provide remedies to inaccurate
or misleading statements on agency websites).
484. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2680.
485. Id. § 2680(h).
486. Fisher Bros. Sales v. United States, 46 F.3d 279, 288 (3d Cir. 1995); Banfi, 41 Fed.
Cl. at 583–84; Lance Indus., Inc. v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 762, 777–78 (Cl. Ct. 1983);
O’Reilly, The 411 on 515, supra note 7, at 849.
487. O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 7, at 522.
488. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a); Banfi Prods. Corp. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 107, 125–26
(Fed. Cl. 1997).
489. See, e.g., Fisher Bros. Sales, Inc. v. United States, 46 F.3d 279, 282 (3d Cir. 1995)
(dismissing action against FDA under the Federal Tort Claims Act because the FDA’s decision
to publicize and recall fruit imported from Chile upon an anonymous tip and faulty laboratory
testing fell within the discretionary function exemption to Act).
490. See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 2d 833, 837–38 (S.D. Tex. 2000)
(citing numerous cases, including those involving public statements and press releases by the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Attorney’s Offices, the Internal Revenue Service, the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the General Services
Administration, the Immigration and Nationality Service, and the Treasury Department).
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its authority.”491 Thus, ultra vires actions are available, although they
are “intended to be of extremely limited scope.”492 And, as noted
above, such a challenge would be difficult given that most agencies
can probably justify their use of publicity under extremely broad
statutory grants of authority.493
Fourth, perhaps the most intuitive cause of action would be a
procedural due process claim when an agency issues adverse publicity
without notifying the subject or allowing it to respond. However,
my survey of the cases since 1973 show that very few parties make
due process claims,494 and the parties that do get only superficial
treatment in judicial opinions.495 In some cases, a party seemed to
have a due process claim but did not assert it. In others, the agency
provided some informal mechanism for the party to comment or
object beforehand. Rarely do modern agencies release adverse
publicity without first notifying the private party of the agencies’
objections.496 Sometimes, agencies even allow the company that is
the subject of the press release to review and comment on the press
release before it is published, and even request changes or submit its
own language.497 But agency practices vary.

491. Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 189–90 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Dart v. United
States, 848 F.2d 217, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
492. Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 190 (citing Griffith v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 842
F.2d 487, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
493. See supra Part II.A.
494. Only four of the twenty-six opinions surveyed involving adverse agency publicity
since 1973 discussed due process claims. See Indus. Safety Equip. Ass’n v. U.S. Envtl.
Protection Agency, 837 F.2d 1119, 1121–22 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Impro Prods., Inc. v. Block,
722 F.2d 845 (D.C. Cir. 1983); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 504 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ill.
1980); Ajay Nutrition Foods, Inc. v. FDA, 378 F. Supp. 210 (D.N.J. 1974), aff’d mem., 513
F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1975).
495. Indus. Safety Equip., 837 F.2d at 1121–22; Impro Prods., 722 F.2d at 851; Sears,
Roebuck, 504 F. Supp. 268–70.
496. See supra text accompanying notes 1–4. Moreover, even when agency regulations
allow the subjects of investigations to submit written statements before the agency brings a
formal enforcement action, such regulations may not be mandatory and may not create any
procedural rights for the subject. See, e.g., Wellman v. Dickinson, 79 F.R.D. 341, 352–53
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that subject of SEC enforcement action had no constitutional or
statutory procedural right to enforce SEC regulation that allowed the subjects of investigations
to comment prior to formal enforcement).
497. Agencies may go to great lengths to solicit a company’s feedback before issuing
potentially adverse publicity. For example, in Banfi Products Corp. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl.
107, 118 (Fed. Cl. 1997), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms allowed a wine
importer to review drafts of its press release and request changes and submit its own language.
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It also seems more difficult than it should be for companies to
show that they have a sufficient liberty or property interest that
triggers due process rights. Consumer demand for products may be
sensitive to real or perceived sanctioning by the government. Courts
have acknowledged that negative statements about a product can
affect a company’s “cognizable property interest” for due process
purposes, although it is much more difficult to show that an agency’s
statements actually deprived the manufacturer of that property
interest absent some showing that the agency effectively revoked a
license.498 In other cases, courts seem to require the agency
statement to be false or inaccurate in some way, as if an accurate-butdamaging statement could not deprive a party of due process.499 My
research did not find any successful due process claims.
Fifth, parties could assert more creative constitutional violations.
For example, plaintiffs have alleged that agencies use publicity as
retaliation, in violation of plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.500 But
courts have yet to determine whether agency publicity meets the
elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim.501 And Noah
observes that “the Takings Clause imposes no serious constraints”
on agencies that use adverse publicity or other forms of armtwisting.502 Agencies generally use adverse publicity to force
companies to waive statutory rights rather than constitutional
ones.503 Plaintiffs have also asserted that agency publicity violates the
Bill of Attainder Clause.504 Each of these constitutional claims seems
stretched when used to attack agency publicity.
498. Indus. Safety Equip., 837 F.2d at 1119, 1122. For example, when Sears complained
that the EEOC leaked its complaint to the public and “engaged in a media harassment
campaign against” it, the reviewing court found that the alleged damages to its reputation and
goodwill did not show “stigma plus” a more tangible liberty or property interest, such as
decreased sales. Sears, Roebuck, 504 F. Supp. at 268–69. See also EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., No. 79-1957A, 1980 WL 108, at *10–11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 14, 1980).
499. Indus. Safety Equip., 837 F.2d at 1122 (noting that industry buyers who shift to
other products is an “indirect effect” on the aggrieved manufacturers and if “not demonstrated
to be false can hardly be said to constitute a constitutional deprivation of property.”).
500. See, e.g., Trudeau v. FTC, 384 F. Supp. 2d 281, 282 (D.D.C. 2005), aff’d, 456
F.3d 178,190 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
501. Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 191 & n.23.
502. Noah, supra note 7, at 916.
503. Id. at 917.
504. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. For example, Sears claimed that when the EEOC
leaked its complaint against Sears and released adverse publicity, it punished Sears without a
judicial trial. The court spent little time dispatching with this argument because the Bill of
Attainder Clause was intended to prevent “trial by legislature,” and the EEOC is an
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Sixth, causes of action might arise when public statements attach
to more official agency procedures, like rulemaking, though it is
difficult to envision a successful case.505
As a last resort, some parties have tried to seek relief via private
bills in Congress, by which a house of Congress adopts a specific bill
asking the Court of Federal Claims to determine whether the
government should compensate the party for injuries caused by a
federal agency.506 Congress then adopts a private law approving the
compensation, which must be signed by the President,507 but the
Court of Federal Claims routinely denies claims against agencies for
adverse publicity.508 Because an agency’s decision to issue publicity
investigative rather than a legislative agency and had not punished Sears. EEOC v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 504 F. Supp. 241, 270 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (quoting United States v. Brown,
381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965)); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 79-1957A, 1980 WL 108,
at *10–11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 14, 1980) (refusing to determine whether the EEOC has legislative
functions because its actions did not punish Sears).
505. For example, Kaiser Aluminum sued the CPSC after it made several public
statements about problems with aluminum wiring, without naming Kaiser specifically. Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. CPSC, 414 F. Supp. 1047, 1050–52 (D. Del. 1976). The court
refused to dismiss Kaiser’s action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies despite Kaiser
being able to comment during rulemaking, because rulemaking would not provide an adequate
remedy for the CPSC’s public statements. Id. at 1055–56. However, the court denied Kaiser’s
motion for a preliminary restraining order. Id. at 1064. FDA publicity surrounding rulemaking
for health foods and dietary supplements was similarly upheld in part because the FDA’s
statements criticized the entire industry rather than specific manufacturers. Ajay Nutrition
Foods, Inc. v. FDA, 378 F. Supp. 210, 218–19 (D.N.J. 1974) (“[T]his Court holds that an
entire industry, such as the health food processing industry, cannot sue on grounds of
defamation.”), aff’d mem., 513 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1975). The FDA has defended its ability to
release information during rulemaking, arguing that it would be inappropriate to limit this
information because “[r]ules apply generally and affect a wide number of persons.” FDA
Administrative Practices and Procedures, 42 Fed. Reg. 12,436, 12,439 (Mar. 4, 1977) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 2).
506. 28 U.S.C. § 2509 (2006); Banfi Prods. Corp. v. United States, 41 Fed. Cl. 581,
584 (Fed. Cl. 1998) (refusing to grant compensation to wine importer for FDA allegedly
negligently identifying wine as a health hazard because Banfi did not have a valid legal or
equitable claim against the United States); Banfi Products Corp. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl.
107, 140 (Fed. Cl. 1997) (refusing to grant compensation to wine importer after Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms requested recall and issued press release announcing allegedly
tainted wine based on FDA’s testing); Sperling & Schwartz, Inc. v. United States, 218 Ct. Cl.
625, 627 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (refusing to grant compensation to dish importer after FDA press
releases stated that dishes were harmful); O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 7,
at 540.
507. 28 U.S.C. § 2509; O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 7, at 540.
508. Banfi, 40 Fed. Cl. at 140; Cal. Canners & Growers Ass’n v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct.
774, 784–86 (Ct. Cl. 1986) (denying compensation to a fruit growers’ association after
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, FDA Commissioner, and Surgeon General made
public statements that artificial sweetener was carcinogenic in animals, was not generally
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generally falls within exemptions under the FTCA, this also often
precludes recovery in private bills.509 As long as the agency has a
rational basis for issuing the publicity and did not make an error,
courts will be reluctant to grant compensation.510 Parties rarely
recover compensation this way, and some scholars speculate that an
agency’s offending statement “would need to be exceedingly severe
in its negative impact to warrant the huge lobbying and litigation
investment that a private bill would require.”511
It should be noted that regardless of the specific cause of action,
aggrieved parties will have difficulty proving their injuries.
Companies often realize during litigation that it is exceedingly
difficult to prove sufficiently concrete injuries that would sustain any
kind of preliminary injunction or other remedies the courts might
grant.512
Considering these causes of action, parties would seem to have
the best chance of success under the APA or via the due process
clause. But even these claims routinely fail.
c. Are agencies immune from suit? A final unresolved question is
whether agencies are immune from challenge. When agency officials
are sued in their individual capacities to avoid issues of sovereign
immunity, those officials can invoke executive privilege to make
public statements.513 Moreover, at least one court has speculated that
recognized as safe, and should not be used in human foods, primarily because statements were
not erroneous based on data at the time); Lance Indus., Inc. v. United States, 3 Cl. Ct. 762,
780 (Ct. Cl. 1983) (denying compensation to manufacturer of self-defense spray because
federal and state enforcement agencies did not negligently fail to verify rumor that spray caused
debilitating damages before the information was circulated throughout government
enforcement agencies and publicized by media); Sperling & Schwartz, 218 Ct. Cl. at 627
(holding that dish importers did not have legal or equitable claim against the FDA for issuing
press releases that identified products as harmful).
509. Banfi, 40 Fed. Cl. at 125–26.
510. See, e.g., Sperling & Schwartz, 218 Ct. Cl. at 626–27.
511. O’Reilly, Libels on Government Websites, supra note 7, at 540.
512. For example, after Kaiser Aluminum sued the CPSC for public statements it made
while initiating rulemaking to set standards for aluminum wiring, the court found that even if
those statements damaged Kaiser’s business, the damage caused would not be any greater than
damage caused by the public rulemaking procedure itself. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v.
CPSC, 414 F. Supp. 1047, 1063 (D. Del. 1976).
513. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (finding executive privilege against defamation
claim for press release by Acting Director of Office of Rent Stabilization announcing his intent
to suspend employees). In Ajay Nutrition Foods, Inc. v. FDA, a district court held that the
FDA Commissioner and the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare were protected by the executive privilege when making public statements and issuing
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government agencies themselves might have a First Amendment
right to issue publicity, and that courts “should be hesitant to
restrain the Government in speaking out about matters of public
concern absent some very strong overriding showing of
inappropriate harm.”514
These hurdles collectively suggest that agencies impose standards
on themselves, and that courts hold agencies to these standards,
reviewing for an abuse of discretion in appropriate circumstances.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article takes a fresh look at how modern agencies use
modern media against modern regulated parties. Federal agencies
continue to use adverse publicity despite long-standing concerns that
the publicity can be premature, excessive, misleading, or wrong.
Agency announcements often bypass more formal enforcement
tools—sometimes purposefully so. Most agencies do not have
statutory authority to issue adverse publicity, particularly when used
to sanction. And courts generally find that agency publicity is either
not reviewable, or if it is, not redressable. Agencies thus enjoy
virtually boundless discretion to brandish adverse publicity.
Today, the problem is magnified. Overburdened agencies have
more incentives to eschew formal statutory enforcement. Adverse
publicity is less costly, more effective, and essentially immune from
judicial review. New media allows agencies to make announcements
via their websites, or even via Facebook, Twitter, and other social
media du jour. These truncated formats are more susceptible to
being mischaracterized or misunderstood. And hyper-responsive
capital markets can process adverse publicity more swiftly and hastily,
which amplifies all these problems.
This Article offers several ways to cabin agency discretion. Some
reiterate what Gellhorn and ACUS urged nearly four decades ago,
and some are entirely new, based on developments since then. The

press releases critical of regulated industries. Key to the court’s opinion was the statutory
authority granted to the FDA to use its discretion to disseminate information publicly. 378 F.
Supp. 210, 216–17 (D.N.J. 1974) (citing FDA’s authority under 21 U.S.C. § 375), aff’d
mem., 513 F.2d 625 (3d Cir. 1975).
514. FTC v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 1066, 1070–71 (D. Utah 1997)
(acknowledging that counsel for the government “asserted that there was no First Amendment
interest” and that no courts had considered a government agency’s right to speak apart from
individual employees’ rights).
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next step is for Congress, courts, or agencies to revisit the issue, as all
three seem desensitized to the problem since the original ACUS
recommendations highlighted them. The legitimacy of agency
actions is important. Regulated firms voluntarily comply with agency
regulations as much out of respect for their necessity and
legitimacy515 as out of fear.516
These recommendations would undoubtedly tie agencies’ hands.
And in an era when agencies often struggle to fulfill their statutory
responsibilities and adequately enforce their regulations, one can
reasonably question why we should further constrain agencies.
Resource-constrained agencies should be able to use whatever
leverage they can muster.
This Article recognizes that agency publicity is part of a larger
story about regulatory enforcement in imperfect conditions.
Agencies should have wide discretion to issue publicity, but should
not be able to abuse that power. And if this unduly constrains their
ability to encourage compliance with their regulatory schemes,
Congress should not only authorize agencies to take more efficient
enforcement actions by statute, but should also provide them the
necessary resources to do so. Until then, agencies, courts, and
Congress should impose some standards on agencies.
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516. DANIEL CARPENTER, REPUTATION AND POWER: ORGANIZATIONAL IMAGE AND
PHARMACEUTICAL REPUTATION AT THE FDA 654–660 (2010).
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